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Abstract 
Renewable energy has become a multi-billion dollar industry in the United States with the 
assistance of billions of dollars in state and federal financial incentives.  As renewable energy 
continues to be discussed as the future of our electrical energy, this topic will become 
increasingly important in the years to come.  To help this young industry, state governments 
have adopted several hundred policies that are designed to encourage the installation of 
renewable energy systems.  With billions of dollars on the line, it is important to understand what 
influences the adoption of these policies.  While examining the adoption of the twenty-two 
different types of renewable energy policies that states have adopted, I implement a strategy of 
analysis that is designed to address several methodological concerns that are typically associated 
with these types of studies.  In the end, the statistical evidence supports my analytical 
innovations, and I provide a strong understanding of what influences a state to adopt these 
policies.  While understanding what influences a state to adopt these policies is important to our 
understanding of state politics and policymaking in general, it is also essential to determine if 
these policies achieve their intended goals of encouraging the installation of renewable energy 
systems.  Previous research suggests that using financial incentives to achieve a policy goal 
typically fails.  Using an improved analytical approach, I examine the influence of these policies 
on the construction of wind turbines in each state.  The results provide evidence that some of 
these policies provide a strong impact on the construction of wind turbines.  Importantly, these 
results can inform policymakers as to which policies appear to be successful, and which may not 
be worth the loss of tax revenue. 
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Renewable Energy Policy:  
An Outline to a Dissertation 
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As the cost of fossil fuels continued to climb, policies that encouraged renewable energy 
became increasingly important to the public.  Experimentation began at all levels of government 
to address these ever more worrisome problems.  One such solution was renewable energy, 
which would simultaneously address both global warming and fossil fuel costs.  Given a lack of 
federal direction regarding renewable energy policy, states have become more proactive in 
determining how to best use their natural energy resources (Brown, Brutoco, and Cusumano 
2007). 
One way states have addressed this is through creating an incentive structure to foster the 
still fledgling, yet potentially effective, renewable energy industry.  The traditional way to do 
this has been to offer financial incentives to construct renewable energy production systems such 
as photovoltaic solar arrays or wind turbine units.  In addition to financial incentives, states have 
adopted policies that offer rules and regulations that better facilitate the construction of these 
systems. 
Surprisingly, despite the importance of addressing the escalating fossil fuel costs, there 
has been relatively little examination of renewable energy policymaking, which happens to be 
one of the few solutions to this problem that could have an obvious, long-term impact with 
relatively little impact on society.  Those that have examined renewable energy have largely 
done so from a historical perspective (e.g. Laird 2001), an examination of public opinion (e.g. 
Firestone and Kempton 2007), or from an international perspective (e.g. Szarka 2004).  With 
only two exceptions (Stoutenborough and Beverlin 2008; Wiener and Koontz 2010), there has 
been little examination of the policymaking process associated with the state adoption of the 
twenty-two different types of renewable energy policy. 
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This project seeks to offer a comprehensive examination of state renewable energy 
policy.  To do so, it is divided into two sections.  The first section examines the adoption of all 
twenty-two state renewable energy policies.  This section will implement several innovative 
analytical procedures.  It is divided into four chapters.  The first, Chapter 2, examines the 
literature that is useful for understanding state renewable energy policy adoption.  Chapter 3 
establishes a universal analytical approach that will allow for comparisons across policies.  
Chapter 4 examines the adoption of state financial incentives, and Chapter 5 examines the 
adoption of state rules and regulations. 
Section 2 attempts to determine if these policies have achieved their goals of promoting 
the construction of renewable systems.  Meier (1994) argues that this is a critical part of the 
public policy process.  Therefore, Chapter 6 evaluates the success or failures of these policies.  
Importantly, existing research suggests that attempts by government to achieve an environmental 
policy goal through financial incentives have failed (e.g. Caldwell 1970; Sagoff 1988).  Clearly, 
renewable energy policies are attempting to achieve an environmental policy goal, usually 
through financial incentives, yet we find that the wind energy industry has been thriving in recent 
years.  Have these policies succeeded when others have failed?  To test this, I devise several 
methodological advancements that differentiate this project from those previous studies of policy 
impact, which allows for a proper examination of the true influence these policies have on the 
construction of wind turbines. 
Finally, concluding remarks will be found in Chapter 7.  In the end, I will have a good 
understanding of what influences a state to adopt renewable energy policies, and if these policies 
actually achieve their goals.  I will also offer several analytical innovations that should improve 
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comparative state policy adoption studies, as well as policy impact studies.  Several interesting 
results will be identified, and future avenues of research will be suggested. 
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The focus of this section is to understand state renewable energy policy adoption.  As 
laboratories of democracy, U.S. states have been very active in adopting policies regarding 
renewable energy.  Generally, these policies fall into one of two categories – financial incentives 
or rules and regulations.  Each category encompasses several different types of policies that each 
seek to encourage or facilitate renewable energy in a different manner. 
Financial incentive policies are those that provide some sort of monetary assistance to 
encourage the installation of a renewable energy system.  These include general tax incentives, 
state-backed loans and grants, and production incentives.  Table 2.1 presents a summary of state 
adoption of financial incentive policies through July 2010.  As Table 2.1 illustrates, states have 
experimented with several policies that provide financial incentives. 
State rules and regulations represent policies that operate behind the scenes to encourage 
the development of renewable energy.  Rules and regulations include policies that essentially 
require renewable energy installations, regulations that are designed to protect consumers, and 
those that regulate construction procedures.  Table 2.2 presents a summary of state adoption of 
rules and regulations through July 2010.  As Table 2.2 indicates, states have also been very 
active in creating rules and regulations for renewable energy systems. 
Recognizing that states have adopted several hundred renewable energy policies since the 
mid-seventies, I seek to understand what influences a state to adopt one of these policies.  This 
chapter proceeds in two parts.  The first reviews previous research on energy and politics.  The 
second identifies how policy adoption theory helps to explain state renewable energy policy 
adoption. 
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Table 2.1:  State Adoption of Renewable Energy Financial Incentives through July 2010 
State 
Production 
Incentives 
Personal 
Tax 
Corporate 
Tax 
Sales 
Tax 
Property 
Tax 
Production 
Rebates 
Excise 
Tax 
Grants Loans Bonds 
Industry 
Support 
Alabama        1 1   
Alaska        1 1   
Arizona  2 1 1 2      1 
Arkansas            
California 1    1 6  1    
Colorado    2 2   1 1   
Connecticut    1 1 1  4 2  2 
Delaware      1  2    
Florida   1 1 1 1  1    
Georgia  1 1         
Hawaii 1 1 1      1  1 
Idaho  1  1 1    1 1  
Illinois    1 2 1  2 1 1  
Indiana     1   1    
Iowa  1 3 1 3  1 1 2   
Kansas     1    1  1 
Kentucky  1 2 1    1 1   
Louisiana  1 1  1    2   
Maine 1   1  1  1    
Maryland  2 2 1 3 3  1 3  1 
Massachusetts 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 1  3 
Michigan     2   2   4 
Minnesota 1   2 1 1  1 6   
Mississippi         1   
Missouri         1   
Montana  2 1  3    1  2 
Nebraska  1 1 1     1   
Nevada 1   1 3 1   1   
New Hampshire     1 1   2   
New Jersey 2   1 1 2  1 1  1 
New Mexico  4 3 4 1    1 1 1 
New York  2 1 1 2 2  2 3  2 
North Carolina 1 1 1  1   1 3   
North Dakota  1 1  2       
Ohio   1 1 1   4 2  1 
Oklahoma   1      3  1 
Oregon 1 1 1  1 4  2 2  1 
Pennsylvania     1 1  7 5  3 
Rhode Island 1 1 1 1 2   1 1   
South Carolina 1 1 2      1   
South Dakota     3       
Tennessee     1   1 1  1 
Texas   1  1   2 2  1 
Utah  1 1 1       1 
Vermont 1 1 1 1 1 1  2 2   
Virginia     1 2     1 
Washington 1   1       1 
West Virginia  1 1  1       
Wisconsin    1 1 1  1   2 
Wyoming    1  1      
Total 14 28 32 29 50 33 3 48 58 3 32 
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Table 2.2:  State Adoption of Renewable Energy Rules and Regulation Policies through July 2010 
State 
Renewable 
Portfolio 
Standards 
Green 
Power 
Purch. 
Required 
Green 
Power 
Public 
Benefits 
Fund 
Constr. 
& 
Design 
Access 
Laws 
Interconnection 
Net 
Metering 
Extension 
Analysis 
Contract 
License 
Equip. 
Cert. 
Alabama            
Alaska      1  1    
Arizona 1    3 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Arkansas     1  1 1    
California 1   1 3 2 1 1  1  
Colorado 1  1  3 1 1 1 1   
Connecticut 1 1  1 2  1 1  1  
Delaware 1   1 1 1 1 1    
Florida     1 1 1 1  1 1 
Georgia     1 1 1 1    
Hawaii 1    1 1 1 1  1  
Idaho      1      
Illinois 1 1  1 2  1 1    
Indiana  1   1 1 1 1    
Iowa 1  1   1 1 1    
Kansas 1     1 1 1    
Kentucky      1 1 2    
Louisiana       1 1    
Maine 1 1  1 1 2  1    
Maryland 1 1   1 1 1 1    
Massachusetts 1 1  2 3 1 1 1    
Michigan 1   1 2  1 1    
Minnesota 2   1 1 1 1 1    
Mississippi            
Missouri 1    1 1 1 1    
Montana 1  1 1  2 1 1    
Nebraska      1 1 1    
Nevada 1     1 1 1  1  
New Hampshire 1     1 1 1    
New Jersey 1   1 2 2 1 1    
New Mexico 1  1  1 1 1 1    
New York 1 1  1 2 1 1 1    
North Carolina 1    1 1 1 1    
North Dakota 1     1  1    
Ohio 1   1 1 1 1 1    
Oklahoma     1   1    
Oregon 1  1 1 3 2 1 1  1 1 
Pennsylvania 1 1  1 1  1 1    
Rhode Island 1   1 1 1  1    
South Carolina     1  1     
South Dakota 1    1  1     
Tennessee      1      
Texas 1    1  1 1 1   
Utah 1     1 1 1  1  
Vermont 1   1  1 1 1    
Virginia 1  1  1 2 1 1    
Washington 1  1  1 1 1 1    
West Virginia 1       1    
Wisconsin 1 1  1 1 2 1 1    
Wyoming       1 1    
Total 36 9 7 18 47 43 40 46 3 8 3 
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Energy and Politics Literature 
The examination of energy policies have traditionally focused on the activities of the 
national government.  This is to be expected as Gormley (1986) recognizes that policy areas that 
are both complex and salient are typically the domain of the national government.  Indeed, he 
specifically identifies nuclear licensing, electric utility regulation, gas utility regulation, and 
power plant siting as energy issues that the national government dominates (Gormley 1986, 600).   
The majority of the relatively, recent examinations of energy and politics have tended to 
focus on nuclear energy, public opinion, and were conducted in the 1980s (e.g. Baumgartner 
1989; Gamson 1989; Kasperson et al. 1980; Kitschelt 1986; Kluklinski, Metlay, and Kay 1982; 
Rothman and Lichter 1987; Thomas et al. 1980; Van der Pligt, Eiser, and Spears 1981).  Perhaps 
the best known study of nuclear energy policymaking isn‟t even known for its emphasis on 
nuclear energy.  Certainly, Baumgartner and Jones‟ (1991) examination of nuclear energy is one 
of the most cited studies of energy.  However, this study isn‟t remembered for it analysis of 
nuclear energy policy, instead, it was influential for introducing the idea of punctuated 
equilibrium as a theory of policy adoption.   
By the mid-1990s there were far fewer examinations of energy and politics, most of 
which were relegated to lesser known outlets (e.g. Koopmans and Duyvendak 1995; Miller 
1995).  This coincided with the release of books with dire titles like The Demise of Nuclear 
Energy? (Morone and Woodhouse 1989), and historical perspectives that essentially recognize 
that there is little more to be said about nuclear energy in America (e.g. Duffy 1997).  With 
social scientific attention focusing on the more salient culture war issues of the mid 1990s and 
early 2000s (e.g. Allen 2005; Berry and Berry 1990; Haider-Markel 2001; Hays and Glick 1997; 
12 
 
Jones and Branton 2005; Langer and Brace 2005; Meier 1994; Mooney and Lee 1995; 2000; 
Soule and Earl 2001), energy politics saw relatively little attention.   
The rise of energy prices as a salient issue eventually led many environmentalists to again 
identifying renewable energy as a possible solution to some of the traditional carbon dioxide 
producing, electrical energy options like coal and oil power plants.  However, social scientists 
have been slow to respond with systematic examinations of this issue area.  Unfortunately, most 
of this research focused on the history of renewable energy policymaking going back to the 
Truman administration (e.g. Laird 2001; Simon 2007) or the more technical aspects of renewable 
energy that were better suited for the hard sciences (e.g. Koroneos, Spachos, and Moussiopoulos 
2003; Simon 2007; Voivontas et al. 1998). 
Even as traditional social scientists began to focus their attention to renewable energy, 
studies of the United States have been few and far between (Carleyolsen 2006; Firestone and 
Kempton 2007; Houck and Rickerson 2009; Stoutenborough and Beverlin 2008; Wiener and 
Koontz 2010).  However, European scholars have been more actively examining renewable 
energy politics for several years (e.g. Barry, Ellis, and Robinson 2008; Bell, Gray, and Hagett 
2005; Christensen and Lund 1998; Devine-Wright 2005; Strachan and Lal 2004; Szarka 2004; 
Toke 2005; Toke and Lauber 2007).  Nevertheless, the majority of the social scientific studies of 
renewable energy tend to focus on public opinion or case studies in another country. 
Within the United States, it is clear that the states have been far more active in legislating 
renewable energy.  This is counterintuitive since Gormley (1986) would certainly suggest the 
opposite should be occurring.  The state-by-state patchwork quilt of renewable energy 
policymaking combined with the institution of federalism and the simultaneous policy adoptions 
by the national government creates an environment where previous research into renewable 
13 
 
energy in other countries do little to inform policy adoption in the United States.  As a result, my 
examination of policy adoption will focus heavily on the theories of policy adoption. 
Theories of Public Policy Adoption 
The past couple of decades have ushered in theories of public policy that have greatly 
advanced our understanding of the policymaking process.  Policy theories tend to explain certain 
types of policy adoption better than others.  They all differ in important ways, which typically 
requires the policy scholar to identify the type of policy theory that best fits the policy examined.  
Moreover, some policy theories seem better suited for case studies at either the national or sub-
national level (e.g. Kingdon 1995; Ostrom 2007; Sabatier and Weible 2007; True, Jones and 
Baumgartner 2007).  Others lend themselves to explaining policy adoption from a comparative 
perspective (e.g. Berry and Berry 2007; Dawson and Robinson 1963; Dye 1966; Hofferbert 
1974; Ingram, Schneider and deLeon 2007; Sharkansky 1970). 
I plan to analyze the adoption of all twenty-two state renewable energy policies across the 
fifty U.S. states with the intention of analyzing each policy type in a similar manner to allow 
comparisons across policies.  This analytical design necessitates a comparative approach.  
Complicating this process, it is possible that a different policy theory may best explain each 
adoption if I were to conduct a case study of the adoption of each of these policies in each state.  
For instance, punctuated equilibrium may best explain adoption of a corporate tax incentive 
policy in Arizona, but institutional rational choice may better explain the adoption of this policy 
in Hawaii.  Sadly, while it would be interesting to conduct a case study of the adoption of every 
policy in every state, it is far beyond the scope of this project.  With this in mind, I need to 
identify a theory of policy adoption that is sufficiently broad enough to accurately analyze these 
various policies and simplify this process. 
14 
 
It is often suggested that “the devil is in the details.”  When examining policy adoption, 
this is certainly true.  However, it is possible to identify several universal themes from the 
various policy adoption theories.  By identifying the core elements that each of the policy 
theories has in common, it is possible to create a general, comparative policy analysis that 
identifies important influences on policy adoption.  Additionally, this should allow for these 
analyses to capture several of the qualities that may cause different theories to better explain 
each individual policy. 
Universal Themes 
There are several theories of public policy that are useful to consider when identifying 
universal policy adoption themes.  I will be drawing inspiration from institutional rational choice 
(IRC) (Kiser and Ostrom 1982; Ostrom 2005; 2007), multiple streams framework (MSF) 
(Cohen, March and Olsen 1972; Kingdon 1995; Zahariadis 2007), social construction (SC) 
(Ingram and Schneider 1990; 1993; Ingram, Schneider and deLeon 2007; Mannheim 1936; 
Schneider and Ingram 1988; 1993), the network approach (NA) (Adam and Kriesi 2007; 
Wasserman and Faust 1999), punctuated-equilibrium theory (PE) (Baumgartner and Jones 1991; 
1993; True, Jones and Baumgartner 2007), the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) (Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith 1988; 1993; Sabatier and Weible 2007); innovation and diffusion (Berry and 
Berry 1990; 2007; Walker 1969), and the original conceptions of the policy process using large-n 
comparatives studies (e.g. Blomquist 2007; Dawson and Robinson 1963; Dye 1966; Hofferbert 
1974; Sharkansky 1970).  While policy diffusion and large-n comparative studies are sometimes 
not considered theories (e.g. Schlager 2007), they model characteristics that are fundamental to 
the other theories and offer useful guidance. 
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First, in a comparative state policy adoption study, perhaps the most important universal 
theme is best described by Berry and Berry (1990; 2007) as internal determinants.  Berry and 
Berry (1990; 2007) argue that the differences in social, political, and economic characteristics 
between states influence policy adoption.  Generally, social characteristics can be anything from 
public opinion, interest groups, percent minority, to measures of state urbanity.  Political 
characteristics can represent ruling coalition changes or characteristics, systemic rules and 
regulations, and even characteristics of the bureaucracy.  Economic considerations can be 
virtually anything relating to fiscal or economic policy such as tax rates, but it also includes 
economic measures like tax revenue, per capita household income, and industry specific 
revenues. 
Indeed, while characterized in different ways, every policy adoption theory recognizes 
that these differences are important.  For instance, the ACF recognizes that changes in socio-
economic conditions, public opinion, and systemic governing coalitions all have the ability to 
influence the policy subsystem and adoption (Sabatier and Weible 2007).  The NA likewise 
recognizes that macropolitical constraints influence adoption (e.g. Coleman 1991).  These 
macropolitical constraints are often political, social or economic characteristics.  Additionally, 
IRC also emphasizes how differences are important (Ostrom 2007).  At the heart of IRC is the 
idea that differences in the social, political, and economic characteristics of an institution is 
going to influence policy action.  Indeed, the importance of institutional norms is essentially the 
same as social characteristics, while its focus on common-pool resources inevitably link to 
economic characteristics. Certainly, when trying to understand state policy adoption, it is 
essential to understand the differences between states.  Gray and Hanson argue that “These 
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systematic comparisons are the social scientific equivalent of controlled experiments in natural 
science laboratories” (2008, xi). 
With this in mind, the Stoutenborough and Beverlin (2008) and Wiener and Koontz 
(2010) studies provide a template from which my examinations can build.  Stoutenborough and 
Beverlin (2008) identify three political and two social characteristics that they believe would be 
influential to the adoption of state net metering policies.
1
  Of these, all three political 
characteristics – government ideology (Berry et al. 1998), legislative professionalism (Squire 
2007), and the number of public utility commission employees – provided a statistically 
significant influence on adoption.  However, neither of their social characteristics – citizen 
ideology (Berry et al. 1998) and population density – provided a significant influence.   
Weiner and Koontz (2010) conducted a case study of three states – Ohio, Oregon, and 
Oklahoma – and their adoption of policies to promote the use of small-scale wind energy.  They 
also examine the influence of state characteristics and control for one political characteristic, 
each state‟s Congressional delegation‟s voting record on environmental legislation (LCV 2008).  
They also control for citizen ideology, a social characteristic, and add an economic characteristic, 
per capita wealth.  Weiner and Koontz (2010) emphasize the nuanced nature of citizen ideology 
in promoting environmental protection. 
In addition to the traditional definition of internal determinants, Stoutenborough and 
Beverlin (2008) argue that it is important to also consider issue specific characteristics that may 
not fit nicely into the social, political, and economic categories.  Their approach is consistent 
with Gray and Hanson (2008), who argue that geographical differences are equally important to 
                                                 
1
 Stoutenborough and Beverlin (2008) do not include any economic characteristics because, as they argue, the policy 
they are examining, net metering, does not cost the state any money because it defers the cost to the utility company.  
Accordingly, they infer that economic considerations should not have played an important role in the adoption of 
this policy. 
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understanding state policymaking.  A reading of the different policy theories would not eliminate 
these influences from being consistent with their theoretical underpinnings.  Stoutenborough and 
Beverlin (2008) identify several issue specific characteristics that have the potential to influence 
renewable energy policy adoption.  Specifically, they control for average wind speed, percent of 
the year with sunshine, electric energy consumption, green conditions (Hall and Kerr 1991), and 
the number of nuclear power plants.  They find that, with the exception of percent sunshine, all 
of these have a significant influence on adoption. 
 
Second, all of the policy theories recognize that there is a feedback loop inherent in 
policy action.  Indeed, it is expected that governments should consider prior policy activity when 
adopting new policies.  As Figure 2.1 illustrates, at its simplest, the basic black box, or systems, 
theory of policymaking relies upon the idea that something influences policy activities within the 
mysterious black box, which produces some sort of output, usually a policy, and that this feeds 
back into the system in a never-ending loop (Easton 1953; 1965a; 1965b).  In essence, all of our 
modern policy theories are simply attempts to identify what is happening in the black box and 
what influences the activities within that box.   
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Perhaps the most clearly articulated description of this feedback loop was done by 
Baumgartner and Jones (2002).  For my purposes, their take-home points are that the system 
constantly feeds into itself, and that these feedbacks can be both positive and negative.  Positive 
feedbacks provide a sort of band-wagon effect where policy adoption may build based on 
momentum gained by the adoption of previous policies.  Negative feedbacks can be caused by a 
number of possible sources, but the end outcome is always a preference for equilibrium, or 
policy inaction.   
The existence of other policies within an issue area may provide sufficient negative 
feedback to discourage the adoption of additional policies.  Interestingly, nothing within 
Baumgartner and Jones‟s (2002) description of these feedbacks would suggest that both 
influences couldn‟t occur at the same time.  It is reasonable to expect that the adoption of one 
renewable energy policy may not influence the adoption of another in a meaningful manner, but 
the adoption of another policy may have a positive impact.  Indeed, Balla‟s (2001) examination 
of the adoption of the HMO Model Act, finds that one of the two related policies has a 
significant positive influence in half of the models, while the other has a significant negative 
influence in half. 
Berry and Berry (2007) advocate the importance of including previously adopted policies 
in policy diffusion models.  However, as they note, it has been a slow process to see previously 
adopted policies modeled.  Aside from Balla (2001), I find few examples of this approach (e.g. 
Soule and Earl 2001; Stoutenborough and Beverlin 2008).  Soule and Earl (2001) specifically 
test to see if the likelihood of a state adopting a hate crime policy is influenced by the adoption 
of other hate crime laws. 
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Stoutenborough and Beverlin (2008) crudely attempted to model this feedback loop on 
the adoption of net metering policies.  However, a closer examination of Baumgartner and 
Jones‟s (2002) description of these loops reveal that Stoutenborough and Beverlin (2008) 
incorrectly aggregated several policies into two measures of previous policy adoption.  Clearly, 
they should have modeled each policy on its own instead of aggregating.  It is possible that these 
policies were cancelling each other out in the event that there were both positive and negative 
feedbacks within the aggregated measures.   
Additionally, there must be some sort of evaluation process by which a legislative body 
can determine if existing policies are sufficient to address a specific policy problem.  While all of 
the policy theories acknowledge the importance of this feedback loop, none of them do a 
particularly good job explaining how this actually works, with the exception of PE.  The 
explanation within PE is that there is some learning occurring or that there is an event that causes 
a break from equilibrium (True, Jones and Baumgartner 2007).  However, there is little to 
explain exactly what facilitates this learning.   
In state comparative policy adoption, it is likely that the feedback loop is informed 
through learning and competition between states, from observations based on experience, as well 
as a specific event.  In renewable energy policymaking, there does not appear to a critical event 
that caused the states to break from equilibrium, which suggests that learning in some form is 
likely what informs the evaluation process. 
At the state level, this learning and competition process is generally thought to relate to 
policy diffusion (Berry and Berry 2007).  Policy diffusion typically relies on the premise that a 
non-adopter is more likely to adopt as other states adopt a policy (e.g. Mooney 2001), however 
this relationship could be negative (e.g. Hays and Glick 1997).  Diffusion more accurately 
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represents the process by which the policy spreads throughout the country by means of this 
learning and competition process. Therefore, policy diffusion and feedback loops are not the 
same.   
This still leaves us with two distinct patterns of learning.  One form stems from the 
diffusion, or spreading of policy ideas across the country, and the other draws from experience.  
Unless a state is learning from the diffusion of international policies or city policies, the first 
state to adopt a new policy is likely to adopt the policy based upon experience.  This appears to 
be the way Baumgartner and Jones (2002) primarily conceptualize this learning process.  
Unfortunately, this doesn‟t take into consideration the influences of policy diffusion. 
Through policy diffusion, the learning process can be augmented, allowing for the 
traditional process of learning from experience to be circumvented.  Generally, this augmentation 
is probably a good thing as it allows states to be more responsive than they might otherwise.  In 
the quickly changing realm of renewable energy policy, this augmentation is likely to be 
essential.  This is particularly true when it comes to trying to lure the burgeoning renewable 
energy system manufacturing to one‟s state.   
Aside from augmenting the process, how exactly would policy diffusion influence this 
feedback loop?  The answer is actually quite simple.  While previously adopted policies certainly 
influence future legislative behavior, or lack thereof, knowledge of what other states have done 
will likely influence the way a state evaluates the adequacy these previously adopted policies.  If 
a state learns that their neighbors have adopted a policy that they have not, the non-adopter is 
likely to evaluate their existing policies to determine if they are sufficient to achieve their policy 
goals.  If the state determines that their existing policies are sufficient, they are likely to embrace 
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equilibrium, but if the adoption of a new policy would be beneficial, they are more likely to 
adopt a similar policy.   
Similarly, states are often competing with each other for some prize.  In renewable 
energy, competition has the potential to be highly influential.  Many of the wind farms that have 
been constructed around the country are owned by same companies.  These companies can 
choose where they want to invest in a new project based on a number of characteristics, 
including the availability of financial incentives.  If they are choosing between locations in two 
different states, the availability of these incentive policies may be important to the company.  To 
land the wind farm, competing states may look to improve their competitive standing by 
adoption increasingly generous policies.   
Moreover, states are frequently fighting for manufacturing plants that create renewable 
systems.  The boost to the economy associated with renewable energy is unlike many other 
opportunities in today‟s society because the manufacturing of many products is cheaper in other 
countries.  For a state to land a new manufacturing plant in an industry that is unlikely to see a 
slump in demand or to ship jobs overseas has the potential to be a huge economic boon.
2
  If the 
state is competitive, they may choose to do nothing, but if it is no longer competitive, they may 
choose to adopt a new policy.   
Further influencing this process is the cumulative effect of learning that additional states 
have adopted the same policy.  Indeed, if thirty states have already adopted a policy, the non-
adopter is likely to be far more critical of their current policies than it was when only six states 
                                                 
2
 The manufacturing of wind turbines is unlikely to be done overseas due to the size and weight of the products.  For 
instance, many of the blades for the large wind turbines are eighty feet long.  Logistically and economically, it is not 
likely that these are going to be manufactured overseas and shipped to the United States. 
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had adopted the new policy.  This process could have a greater influence if the states that have 
adopted surround the non-adopter. 
Again, policy diffusion and the feedback loop are two separate processes.  However, it 
would appear that the two are inextricably linked.  Policy diffusion is the mechanism that 
augments the normal learning process that is used to evaluate policies within the feedback loop.  
This means that policy diffusion does not always have to occur for learning to occur.  But, when 
it does occur, it should augment the traditional learning process, which should alter the way a 
state evaluates its current policies. 
This may explain why, as Tables 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate, some states have adopted several 
different policies of the same basic type.  For instance, Minnesota has adopted six different state-
backed loan policies.  Each of these policies is slightly different from the others, with some 
applying to specific groups, and others applying to specific types of projects.  It is likely that this 
piecemeal adoption process is associated with the evaluation process associated with the 
feedback loop.  If this were true, the most likely explanation would be that Minnesota learned 
that other states had adopted slightly different state-backed loan programs, which would cause 
them to evaluate the current status of their state-backed loan policies to determine if they were 
sufficient.  This would indicate that on five different occasions, Minnesota decided to adopt a 
new state-backed loan policy because they did not feel like the existing policies were sufficient. 
Third, time is an important influence in adoption.  All policy theories attempt to explain 
policy activity over some period of time.  Sabatier (2007) argues that it may take a decade or 
more to study a policy (see also Kirst and Jung 1982; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993).  It can 
take a number of years before everything involved in the policy activity becomes clear, and even 
after decades; it may not be clear what exactly happened.  As MSF outlines, policy solutions are 
23 
 
likely available long before there is an opportunity to actually enact them (Kingdon 1995).  
Indeed, even when a policy seems to appear overnight, the policy solution was probably floating 
around for a number of years before a window of opportunity presented itself.   
Comparative state policy adoption studies clearly recognize the need to study a policy 
over a long period of time.  In particularly, policy diffusion studies regularly examine adoption 
over several years or even decades (e.g. Allen, Pettus, and Haider-Markel 2004; Berry and Berry 
1990; Haider-Markel 2001; Hays and Glick 1997; Mooney 2001; Shipan and Volden 2006; 
Stoutenborough and Beverlin 2008; Volden 2006).  In renewable energy policymaking, states 
first began adopting policies in the mid-seventies, and continue today.  This creates an 
environment that requires examinations over long periods of time. 
Summary 
I identified three core, or universal, components of all of the public policy theories, and 
explained how some of the more relevant previous studies of energy policy fit within these 
components.  The first was the importance of what Berry and Berry (1990; 2007) would call 
internal determinants, or the political, social, and economic characteristics of a state.  The second 
was the feedback loop where previously adopted policies influence the adoption of future 
policies.  Finally, time was identified as an important influence on policy adoption.   
These universal components of public policy theories will be used in Chapter 3 to build a 
methodological approach to study the adoption of twenty-two state renewable energy policies.  
By breaking these theories down to these core components, it is expected that comparisons will 
be able to be drawn across policies.  Additionally, a reliance on these components should allow 
for analyses of the core influences on policy adoption, which could potentially be expanded upon 
in case studies in future projects. 
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 This project seeks to understand what has influenced a state to adopt a renewable energy 
policy.  Because these analyses are intended to examine every policy within the renewable 
energy policy arena, each policy adoption model will use the same general approach.  Relying on 
the core components found in public policy theories outlined in Chapter 2, I designed a universal 
modeling scheme.  I hope that this will allow for useful comparisons between the different 
models.   
Dependent Variables & Models 
There are many different approaches that can be used to analyze policy adoption.  
However, when comparing adoption across fifty states over thirty-five years, the standard 
approach has been through a discrete, cross-sectional time-series that is a non-repeating event 
history analysis (EHA) (Buckley and Westerland 2004; Mooney 2001).   
The dependent variables for these analyses are coded based on when a state adopted each 
type of policy.  Specifically, it is coded such that in the years in which a state does not have a 
policy it is given a “zero” and the year that a state adopts the policy is coded “one.”  As a 
combination between a time series and a cross-sectional model, data was collected for each state 
for every year between 1974 and 2008.  Using a thirty-five year range ought to satisfy the third 
core component that is found in policy theories, which is that sufficient time must have passed 
before examining a policy. 
For discrete-time data, the dependent variable is essentially the same as the duration time 
(Yamaguchi 1992).  When coding a discrete-time event using a yearly duration period, the 
dummy variable for policy adoption always corresponds with the year the policy was adopted.  
In other words, the end of the duration is always the same as the year policy adoption takes 
place.  Essentially, both measures reach the same conclusion, that policy A was adopted in year 
27 
 
X.  This means that a dependent variable coded with zeroes and ones is the equivalent to an 
actual duration time (Beck, Katz and Tucker 1998; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2003).  
Consequently, it can be estimated in terms of maximum likelihood estimators (Allison 1984), 
which is traditionally accomplished using a logit model (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2003).  
Because EHA models are predicting non-repeatable events each state is dropped from the 
years following the adoption of a policy.  Thus, I make the assumption that the policy adopted 
cannot be readopted at some future time.  This assumption is reasonable when considering 
innovative policy adoption.
3
 
When using panel data, it is essential to allow for different intercepts for each panel 
member – each state.4  When using a dichotomous dependent variable in a cross-sectional time-
series model, random effects are the optimal option because of the limitations of the y-intercept 
inherent in these models (Kennedy 2003).  Furthermore, Beck (2001, 290) notes that fixed 
effects should not be used on panel data.  Beck and Katz (2001) go as far as to say that fixed 
effects should never be used when there is a dichotomous dependent variable in a paneled, time-
series model.  A random effects model is designed to overcome fixed effects concerns, which 
can create a more efficient estimator of slope coefficients (Kennedy 2003).
5
   
When using discrete data, there are several distributions that can be used to estimate 
relationships between the dependent variable and independent variables.  Estimation is done by 
treating the probability of adoption as conditional on remaining a non-adopter and various 
                                                 
3
 A concern often associated with this approach is that a state can always repeal any given policy at any time.  While 
this is a possibility for renewable energy policies, it is not a major concern of this examination.  I am not attempting 
to explain policy continuance or the policy repeal process.  Instead, these analyses are seeking to understand what 
influenced a state to adopt its first policy in each of the twenty-two policy areas. 
4
 In time-series analysis, panel data and cross-sectional data are same.  The terms are used interchangeably, but hold 
the same meaning. 
5
 A fundamental assumption of a random effects model is that the independent variables are treated as strictly 
exogenous (Hsiao 2003). 
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independent variables.  Generally, the two most common distributions that are used with a 
dichotomous dependent variable are the logit and probit distributions (Box-Steffensmeier and 
Jones 2003; Buckley and Westerland 2004).   
There is an additional option available called the complementary log-log distribution 
(Cloglog).  The Cloglog is not widely used within the social sciences (Box-Steffensmeier and 
Jones 2003), but it provides an alternative to the probit and logit distributions based on its 
treatment of the s-shaped curve.  The probability, λi, of the logit and probit response curves are 
symmetric around λi = 0.5.
6
  The Cloglog response curve begins slowly from λi = 0.0 and rapidly 
approaches λi = 1 (Agresti 1990, 248).
7
  Because it more rapidly approaches λi = 1, the slope of 
the s-shaped curve for a Cloglog is closer to being perfectly vertical than a logit or probit.  This 
means that estimated event probabilities based on the Cloglog model could be significantly 
different than the results found in a logit or probit-based model.  Buckley and Westerland (2004) 
recommend that diffusion scholars use the Cloglog because it is the discrete analog of the Cox 
proportional hazards model, which is the most common type of duration model.  They also argue 
that the Cloglog may be the best option because policy adoption is rare, and this treatment best 
accounts for rare events.  Because the data for each policy contains more than one thousand 
“zeroes” and a maximum of fifty “ones”, we are clearly examining rare events.  Thus, the 
Cloglog uses the most appropriate functional form to use in the statistical models that follow. 
EHA is a model that relies on the probability of a state adopting a policy that is constant 
over time (Allison 1984, 17-18).  This probability is called the hazard rate, which is flat in 
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 Here, λi represents the probability of adoption for the ith case, or state. 
7
 The probability of the complementary log-log is:  )]exp(exp[1),Pr(  ititit xxy  . 
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relation to time.  If this proposition – the hazard rate – is violated, the estimated slope of the 
variable correlated with the hazard rate will be biased in the direction of that correlation (Beck, 
Katz, and Tucker 1998).  Since policy diffusion has been illustrated as a strong influence on the 
adoption of policies, and it provides an explanation of how states learn what other states have 
adopted, which informs the feedback loop, it is essential to control for its influence.  As such a 
diffusion variable is always increasing as each additional state adopts a policy.  This causes the 
hazard rate to become unstable, which results in a positive effect (Rogers 1995).  To correct for 
this instability, EHAs require either a trend variable (e.g. Greene 2000; Haider-Markel 2001; 
Hays and Glick 1997; Mooney and Lee 1995) or annual dummy variables (e.g. Allison 1984, 18; 
Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998; Mintrom 1997; Mintrom and Vergari 1998; Stoutenborough and 
Beverlin 2008).   
To create a trend variable, the researcher must make assumptions about the hazard rate 
that are conditional on the other variables in the model (Buckley and Westerland 2004; Mooney 
2001).  These two options would alleviate the problems associated with duration dependence, 
thus allowing for a more accurate estimation of the model. While a common solution to this 
problem is to simplify the process by using annual dummy variables (e.g. Balla 2001; Beck, 
Katz, and Tucker 1998; Mintrom 1997; Mooney 2001; Shipan and Volden 2008; Stoutenborough 
and Beverlin 2008), this option is not optimal in this situation because it would create up to 
thirty-four dummy variables for each policy.  This would create estimation problems, which will 
be discussed in greater detail in a moment.  To prevent these estimation concerns, a trend 
variable was created for each year for each policy.  The trend variable was created by taking the 
square root of the number of years before and after the year in which each policy saw the most 
adoption.  This approach should stabilize the hazard rate (e.g. Haider-Markel 2001), and it will 
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ensure that there are not spurious relationships found as a result of an unstable hazard rate 
(Mooney 2001).   
Independent Variables 
The policymaking process is typically described as a fairly complex process composed of 
many moving parts (e.g. Sabatier and Weible 2007).  Additionally, as noted in Chapter 2, every 
theory of the policymaking process includes some sort of a feedback loop that indicates that, 
within a policy arena, previously adopted policies ought to influence the adoption of future 
policies (e.g. Adam and Kriesi 2007; Berry and Berry 2007; Blomquist 2007; Ingram, Schneider 
and deLeon 2007; Ostrom 2007; Sabatier and Weible 2007; True, Jones and Baumgartner 2007).  
However, research into policy adoption typically either minimizes this influence or simply 
ignores it.
8
   
One of the goals of this project is to determine the extent to which our statistical 
modeling of policy adoption has been limited due to our minimization of this influence.  As we 
know, models that are better specified are going to provide better explanations of whatever 
phenomenon we are looking to examine.  Simply put better statistical models and measures will 
provide a more accurate picture of the phenomena, and we have all witnessed the effects of 
adding and subtracting variables from our statistical models.  Over time, social scientists have 
found that better models and measures force us to reconsider what we thought we knew about 
certain phenomena.  Will the same be true in the policy adoption literature?  In this tradition, two 
types of models will be estimated for each policy.  The first will be a more traditional, reduced 
model of policy adoption.  These will rely on variables that are more traditionally found in policy 
adoption studies.  The second will model the influence of existing policy on the adoption of new 
                                                 
8
 Three exceptions to this are Balla (2001), Soule and Earl (2001), and Stoutenborough and Beverlin (2008).   
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policies, which will represent the feedback loop outlined in Chapter 2.  In essence, the second 
approach will more accurately reflect policy theory, and it should allow for a better 
understanding of the policymaking process.   
This influence of specific policies can take many forms, which makes them very difficult 
to predict.  On one hand, in an ideal world, once an institution adopts a policy within an arena 
they should not have to adopt any others because they will have already addressed the problem.  
On the other hand, it is possible that once they have committed to a particular arena, they may be 
more likely to adopt additional policies to achieve a legislative goal.  There are many examples 
of both of these outcomes, and Baumgartner and Jones (2002) probably best sum up the 
unexpected nature of these two options through their description of positive and negative 
feedbacks.  The existence of other policies within a policy arena may provide sufficient negative 
feedback to discourage the adoption of additional policies.  There is nothing to suggest that these 
feedbacks couldn‟t result in both influences at the same time.  For instance, perhaps the adoption 
of one specific policy creates a positive feedback, while the adoption of a different policy creates 
a negative feedback within the same institution.  Indeed, Balla (2001) finds that one of the two 
related policies has a significant positive influence in half of the models, while the other has a 
significant negative influence in half.   
Accordingly, perhaps the most interesting independent variables found in these analyses 
will be those representing policies that have already been adopted within a state.  There is little to 
suggest that most of these policies will either have a positive or negative impact on the adoption 
of other policies.  Therefore, for the majority of the policies, the only expectation is that they will 
have an impact on the adoption of a different policy.   
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However, there are four policies that ought to have a positive impact on the adoption of 
other policies.  The adoption of renewable portfolio standards potentially represents a change in 
the state legislature.  These policies are designed to set production goals for the state, and their 
adoption should result in an increased likelihood of adoption of additional policies because 
incentive policies may be viewed as the best mechanism to enable the standards to be met.  
Therefore, it is anticipated that states that have adopted renewable portfolio standards are more 
likely to adopt additional legislation. 
Likewise, states that have adopted a public benefits fund should be more likely to adopt 
additional policies.  Public benefits funds are typically special taxes that are levied on energy 
consumption.  The funds that are raised as a result of these taxes are then put into a large pool 
that is used to fund the financial incentives that the state offers.  If a state adopts one of these 
policies, there ought to be subsequent legislation that instructs how that money should be used.
9
 
Finally, states can adopt green power purchasing and required green power policies.  For 
both of these policies to be successful, there must be green power being created.  Green power 
purchasing policies require state agencies and facilities to purchase a predetermined percentage 
of their electrical energy from renewable sources.  Required green power policies mandate that a 
predetermined percentage of an electrical company‟s energy be created by renewable sources.  In 
short, both require that energy companies create energy using renewable sources.  Therefore, it is 
expected that states that adopt either of these policies will be more likely to adopt additional 
policies to facilitate the construction of renewable systems. 
                                                 
9
 It is possible that the opposite could be true if the public benefits fund was created to fund existing programs.  
However, it is expected that, like the renewable portfolio standards, this will mark a change in the legislative 
emphasis on renewable energy. 
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Associated with this feedback process is the process known as policy diffusion.  Policy 
diffusion is grounded in the idea that states will be influenced by what other states have 
attempted when addressing a problem.  This process can occur through learning, competition, or 
public persuasion (Berry and Berry 2007).  As noted in Chapter 2, it is likely that this process of 
diffusion helps to inform the feedback loop by allowing a state to augment the learning process 
and evaluate the effectiveness of their current approach to the problem.  If they are satisfied with 
their policy solutions, they are not likely to adopt a new policy.  However, if they are not 
satisfied, it is possible that a state may be more likely to adopt a new policy if other states have 
already done so. 
Existing policy adoption research has recognized the importance of controlling for the 
influence of policy diffusion for a couple of decades (e.g. Berry and Berry 1990; Haider-Markel 
2001; Mooney 2001; Stoutenborough and Beverlin 2008).  While few of these examinations 
actually control for the influence of other policies, their inclusion of diffusion essentially serves 
the same function that I describe, which is that states evaluate their current solutions to the 
problem and determine if they should consider what other states have adopted.  Because of this 
evaluation function, these studies tend to find that diffusion generally has a positive influence on 
adoption (Mooney 2001).  This is to be expected since scholars tend to focus their studies on 
innovative policy solutions.  If the solution is innovative, then it is more likely that an evaluation 
of the policy would conclude with a suggestion that the state should adopt a version of the 
policy.  However, sometimes diffusion can actually have negative impact (e.g. Hays and Glick 
1997).  This would suggest that an evaluation of the policy revealed that it was not successful, or 
that it had negative externalities.  Regardless, the wealth of studies into diffusion, particularly 
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regional diffusion in its many forms, suggests that any policy adoption model with U.S. states as 
the unit of analysis needs to include a control for this influence.   
While controlling for diffusion, it is important to recognize that there are many different 
forms of diffusion that can augment the learning process and influence the evaluation process.  
Because the mechanism responsible for the actual diffusion may not be obvious, diffusion is 
difficult to actually identify.  As a result, diffusion studies tend to declare that one particular 
brand of diffusion is responsible for the spread of a policy across the country.  Interestingly, this 
process is usually achieved through fiat, as there are seldom any justifications for choosing one 
form over another.  Stoutenborough and Beverlin (2008) illustrate how this identification process 
can be systematically analyzed to try to use prima facie evidence that might suggest which form 
of diffusion is most appropriate.  Examining their policy, they identify regional diffusion using 
EPA regions as the most likely route diffusion followed, as opposed to leader-laggard and 
neighbor diffusion.  However, they felt it was more appropriate to test the prima facie evidence 
as opposed to blindly declaring it the best explanation.  Stoutenborough and Beverlin (2008) 
estimated three nearly identical statistical models to verify that EPA-based regional diffusion 
was the most appropriate.
10
  They also suggest that policy scholars should use this approach in 
their analyses.  Indeed, if we use the wrong indicator of diffusion in our analyses, our analyses 
are not going to be properly specified, which should make us question their accuracy. 
Stoutenborough and Beverlin (2008) also discuss the possibility that there might be 
leader-laggard influences within a region or among geographic neighbors.  The basic idea is that 
the relative influence of every state within the region is unlikely to be identical, which is how 
traditional regional and neighbor diffusion treats these states.  Stoutenborough (2009) has since 
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 The only difference between the models was the diffusion variable. 
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examined this phenomenon by replicating Stoutenborough and Beverlin‟s study and adding what 
he refers to as a “hybrid” measure of diffusion.  Essentially, he argues that there is no reason to 
think that leader-laggard diffusion and regional/neighbor diffusion are mutually exclusive.  His 
analysis reveals that a hybrid measure of EPA regional diffusion and leader-laggard diffusion 
create a better specified model than the standard EPA regional measure.  Stoutenborough has 
since used the same hybrid technique to replicate Berry and Berry‟s (1990) original state lottery 
adoption study using three different leader-laggard measures.  All three of these hybrid measures 
also resulted in statistically significantly better specified models than those used in the original 
study.  Together, these replications indicate that it may be important to control for this “hybrid” 
approach to measuring policy diffusion. 
Because the goal of these analyses is to create the best understanding of renewable 
energy policy adoption possible, five different measures of policy diffusion will be analyzed and 
compared to one another.  As mentioned, policy diffusion is particularly difficult to pin down.  
Indeed, although Stoutenborough and Beverlin (2008) were able to find support for their prima 
facie evidence, Stoutenborough (2009) finds that the prima facie evidence was only partially 
correct, but ultimately not optimal.  Aside from specification advantages, there is also no reason 
to believe that all of the renewable energy policies will spread in the same manner; therefore, it is 
advantageous to examine all five measures and compare them to one another for all of the 
policies.   
The five diffusion measures are policy-specific replications of those used by 
Stoutenborough (2009) and Stoutenborough and Beverlin (2008).  Specifically, these measures 
will represent diffusion within EPA regions, between neighbors, between leaders and laggards, 
and a hybrid measure of both EPA regions and neighbors that take into consideration leaders and 
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laggards within these groups.  EPA regions were chosen because they have been identified as 
possible conduits through which states may learn what other states are doing (e.g. Crotty 1987; 
Daley and Garand 2005; Stoutenborough and Beverlin 2008).
11
  Relying on geographical 
neighbors has also been a common way to measure diffusion (e.g. Berry and Berry 1990).  The 
influence of leader-laggard diffusion is examined using an inverted version of Hall and Kerr‟s 
(1991) Green Policy Index (e.g. Stoutenborough and Beverlin 2008).   
To create the hybrid measures of diffusion, a weighted leader-laggard score was first 
created.  Table 3.1 presents the weighted leader-laggard scores for each state.  First, the Green 
Policy Index score (Hall and Kerr 1991) for each state was inverted to make them more intuitive.  
Inverting the index creates a score such that the “greenest” state, California, had the highest 
score, while the least “green” state, Arkansas, had the lowest score.  Second, the weighted 
leader-laggard score was created by dividing the inverted green policy score by 1,925.  This 
resulted in eighteen states with weighted scores that were greater than one.  This approach allows 
us to identify leader states from laggard states. 
The hybrid diffusion measures combine the influences of regional diffusion and leader-
laggard diffusion.  To create a hybrid measure, the relative impact of a given state on another 
state within a region, or to a neighbor, is multiplied by the weighted leader-laggard score.  In 
essence, the hybrid measure will either give a state a greater influence or lessen its overall 
influence within its region or on its neighbors.  For instance, within EPA Region 9, California 
ought to have a 0.333 impact on another state within that region under a normal regional 
diffusion measure.  However, the hybrid model takes into consideration the leader status 
California holds on environmental issues.  The hybrid regional measure would say that  
                                                 
11
 A list of the membership of each EPA region can be found in Appendix A. 
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California would now have a 0.534 (0.333 x 1.603) impact on another state within its region.  On 
the other hand, Arkansas, who would usually have a 0.25 impact on states within EPA Region 6, 
would actually have a 0.08 (0.25 x 0.322) impact once their extreme laggard status is taken into 
account.  This approach was used for each policy in each state for both the EPA regional and 
neighbor diffusion measures.  The hybrid approach ought to more accurately measure the impact 
of any state on another if leaders and laggards are influential within either regional diffusion 
measure. 
Table 3.1:  State Weighted Leader-Laggard Scores 
State 
Green 
Policy 
a 
Inverted 
Green 
Policy 
b 
Weighted  
L-L Score 
c State 
Green 
Policy 
a 
Inverted 
Green 
Policy 
b 
Weighted  
L-L Score 
c 
Alabama 3,212 638 0.331 Montana 2,533 1,317 0.684 
Alaska 3,043 807 0.419 Nebraska 2,510 1,340 0.696 
Arizona 2,802 1,048 0.544 Nevada 2,917 933 0.484 
Arkansas 3,230 620 0.322 New Hampshire 2,054 1,796 0.932 
California 764 3,086 1.603 New Jersey 1,150 2,700 1.402 
Colorado 2,330 1,520 0.789 New Mexico 2,729 1,052 0.546 
Connecticut 1,225 2,625 1.363 New York 1,346 2,504 1.300 
Delaware 2,261 1,589 0.825 North Carolina 1,873 1,977 1.027 
Florida 1,604 2,246 1.166 North Dakota 2,762 1,088 0.565 
Georgia 2,505 1,345 0.698 Ohio 2,010 1,840 0.955 
Hawaii 2,239 1,611 0.836 Oklahoma 2,913 937 0.486 
Idaho 2,708 1,142 0.593 Oregon 1,096 2,754 1.430 
Illinois 1,865 1,985 1.031 Pennsylvania 2,058 1,792 0.930 
Indiana 2,332 1,518 0.788 Rhode Island 1,384 2,466 1.281 
Iowa 1,841 2,009 1.043 South Carolina 2,537 1,313 0.682 
Kansas 2,478 1,372 0.712 South Dakota 3,154 696 0.361 
Kentucky 2,625 1,225 0.636 Tennessee 2,843 1,007 0.523 
Louisiana 2,644 1,206 0.626 Texas 2,659 1,191 0.618 
Maine 1,246 2,604 1.352 Utah 2,888 962 0.499 
Maryland 1,660 2,190 1.137 Vermont 1,578 2,272 1.180 
Massachusetts 1,377 2,473 1.284 Virginia 2,181 1,669 0.867 
Michigan 1,552 2,298 1.193 Washington 1,606 2,244 1.165 
Minnesota 1,305 2,545 1.322 West Virginia 2,951 899 0.467 
Mississippi 3,016 834 0.433 Wisconsin 1,261 2,589 1.344 
Missouri 2,182 1,668 0.866 Wyoming 2,924 926 0.481 
a. The Green Policy Index is recreated from Hall and Kerr (1991).  The Green Policy Index is the sum of state rankings from 77 environmental 
policy and leadership indicators.  Each score is out of a total of 3,850, which would be the score for a state that was ranked 50th in every 
indicator. 
b. The Green Policy Index scores were inverted (3,850 – state green policy score) to make it more intuitive.   
c. The Weighted Leader-Laggard Score is calculated by the equation 
Weighted L-L Score = Inverted Green Policy / 1925 
The denominator, 1,925, is half of the 3,850 possible, and represents the score of a state that was ranked exactly 25 th in all 77 indicators 
would achieve. 
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Each of these measures of diffusion is theoretically different from the others.  The EPA 
regional measure anticipates that the EPA regional offices act as the conduits by which states are 
able to learn what other states are doing.  While some regions may have a conflictual relationship 
(e.g. O‟Leary and Raines 2001), the EPA regional offices are always in constant contact with 
their member states EPA offices.
12
  This allows for the sharing of information through a 
relatively simple process.  These offices are going to have the greatest information about their 
member states, which should cause the office to emphasize the policy actions of these states.  
However, because each regional office is a part of the U.S. EPA, they are able to learn what 
other EPA regions are doing, which should facilitate the spread of policy adoption across the 
country. 
Neighbor diffusion is similar to EPA regional diffusion, except that it differentiates itself 
in an important manner.  With neighbor diffusion, there is no administrative body that oversees 
the states and shares information about other states.  Instead, states simply look to see what their 
geographical neighbors are doing to solve a particular problem.  The mechanism of learning in 
neighbor diffusion can vary.  However, the most obvious method of policy learning is going to 
occur by observation.  State legislators that live along the border are more likely to become 
aware of what the neighbor state might be doing.  It is also possible that the public could become 
aware of the neighbor‟s policies, and they might pressure their legislators to adopt similar 
policies.  It is also possible that state Governors could learn what their neighbors have done 
when they attend meetings where all of the states Governors attend.  In short, there are many 
                                                 
12
 O‟Leary and Raines (2001) recognize that some regions are better than others, but they stress that the EPA has 
been taking the lead, amongst federal agencies, to try to resolve these conflicts through the use of their alternative 
dispute resolution programs and processes.  This should improve the relationship between states and their EPA 
regional office, which should improve the likelihood that EPA regional diffusion occurring. 
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possible explanations for how information is spread through neighbor diffusion, and it is very 
difficult to directly identify exactly how this occurs.  
Leader-laggard diffusion relies on the idea that leader states are more likely to adopt than 
laggard states.  Policy learning occurs because leader states are aware of what other leader states 
are doing.  These states are often quick to adopt because they strive to be the best in those policy 
areas, which means they must constantly monitor what other states have done.  Using the Hall 
and Kerr (1991) green policy rankings, it is easy to identify which states are environmental 
leaders, and which are laggards.   
The EPA hybrid measure relies on the same basic premise of the EPA regional model.  
However, it differs in that it recognizes that the EPA regional offices are going to emphasize the 
activities of the leader states within the EPA region.  Again, the EPA regional offices are 
responsible for spreading the information about what other states have done, but they are going 
to accentuate the leaders, which should cause these leaders to have a greater influence on a non-
adopter than the laggards. 
The neighbor hybrid measure is also similar to the traditional neighbor model.  However, 
it differs because it recognizes that a state is more likely to turn to a neighbor state that is 
considered to be a leader in the policy area than a state that is considered a laggard.  The 
influence of these neighbors that are leaders should be far greater than the laggards.  Policy 
learning should occur such that if a state has a problem, they are more likely to look to these 
leader neighbors for a solution. 
To determine which measure of diffusion creates the best specified model, Davidson-
MacKinnon (1993) tests will be estimated for every combination of the five competing models.  
Because coefficient estimates and probabilities appearing stronger does not automatically mean 
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that one measure provides a better explanation than the others, this test is needed.  For this to 
work, the two statistical analyses need to be identical with the exception of one variable, which 
will be the diffusion variable (e.g. Berry and Baybeck 2005; Stoutenborough 2009; 
Stoutenborough and Beverlin 2008).  The Davidson-MacKinnon test is able to determine which 
model is best specified by estimating fitted values for each of the five statistical models and 
using these fitted values within a re-estimation of one of the original five models.  If the fitted 
values from model A are statistically significant when inserted in model B, while the fitted 
values for model B are not statistically significant when inserted in the model A, then model A, 
with the statistically significant fitted values, is statistically significantly better specified than 
model B.  Because the only difference between these models is the diffusion variables, this 
approach, when used for every combination of models, will identify which measure is most 
accurate.
13
  Once the best model is identified, the results of the analyses will be discussed in 
terms of that model.
14
 
Returning to the universal characteristics outlined in Chapter 2, it is important to control 
for the influences of state internal determinants (Berry and Berry 1990; 2007), and policy 
specific characteristics (Gray and Hanson 2008; Hall and Kerr 1991; Stoutenborough and 
Beverlin 2008).  Typically, internal determinants are described as the social (e.g. Gray and 
Lowery 1988), economic (e.g. Downs 1957), and political (e.g. Berry et al. 1998; Squire 2007) 
characteristics of a state that influence policymaking and political behavior.  In short, the 
differences between states in these various areas shape how these states behave in a political 
sense. 
                                                 
13
 In the event that none of the fitted values reveal a statistically significant influence within another model, the 
model that has the best p-values in head-to-head comparisons will be the model discussed.  In these situations, while 
not significantly better than the others, it is still possible to identify the best measure. 
14
 The other four models will not be discussed, unless attention needs to be drawn to variables that were inaccurately 
estimated because the improper measure of diffusion was used. 
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Several internal determinants will be examined in both the traditional and expanded 
statistical analyses.  These analyses control for two social characteristics.  Specifically, the 
models control for the influence of college graduates and citizen ideology (Berry et al. 1998) on 
policy adoption.  Generally, I expect that those with more education are better able to process 
information.  Furthermore, those with more education are generally more predisposed to be 
environmentalists (e.g. Buttel and Flinn 1974).  Accordingly, I anticipate that states with more 
college graduates are more likely to adopt policies that encourage the development of renewable 
energy.  Likewise, liberals are more predisposed to be environmentalists (e.g. Ellis and 
Thompson 1997).  As such, I assume states with more liberal citizens ought to be more likely to 
adopt renewable energy promoting policies.   
Differences in the political characteristics of states are understandably an important 
influence on the political process.  Therefore, two political characteristics are analyzed in these 
models.  Controls are included for state legislative professionalism (Squire 2007) and 
government ideology (Berry et al. 1998).  State legislative professionalism scores are a 
particularly useful tool to use in policy analyses because of the wealth of information that they 
represent (see Squire 2007).  Ringquist (1993) illustrated the importance of professional 
legislatures on the adoption of several environmental policies.  However, Stoutenborough and 
Beverlin (2008) found that legislative professionalism had a negative influence on the likelihood 
of adopting net metering policies.  Despite this more recent finding, it is still anticipated that 
states with more professional legislatures will be more likely to adopt renewable energy 
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policies.
15
  Similar to state citizen ideology, it is expected that more liberal state governments 
will be more likely to adopt a policy. 
Finally, two economic internal determinants are included in these analyses.  The first, tax 
revenue per capita, is intended to capture differences in the relative tax receipts in each state, 
while also taking into consideration the population of the state.  Because most of the policies 
examined are financial incentive policies, it is expected that states with larger levels of tax 
revenue per capita are going to be more likely to adopt financial incentives.  Second, while not 
always associated with economic factors, population density will be examined.  Population 
density is considered an economic influence because of the characteristics usually associated 
with more densely population states.  Certainly, there is a connection between density and 
economic development and wealth (Ciccone and Hall 1996) such that the two directly drive one 
another in a manner that as the economy becomes stronger in a region, more people move there, 
thus increasing density.  As a result, more densely populated states are more likely to have, or 
have had, higher levels of manufacturing.  More densely populated areas are also more likely to 
experience air pollution.  Therefore, these areas ought to be more likely to pursue the use of 
clean alternatives to air polluting energy.   
Additionally, it is important to control for the influence of issue specific state 
characteristics.  Hall and Kerr (1991) suggest that some states have conditions that better suit 
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 Stoutenborough and Beverlin (2008) suggest that a possible cause of this negative outcome is that the net 
metering policy caused utility companies to pay private energy producers the same for extra energy generated as 
they charge their customers.  Therefore, net metering laws would remove all profitability associated with private 
energy providers.  As such, there was every incentive for these companies to lobby heavily against these policies.  
Combine this with Squire‟s (2007) observation that more professional legislatures have larger staffs, which increase 
the ability of lobbyists to influence the political process; it is not surprising that there may be a negative relationship 
between professionalism and net metering policies.  However, this specific example shouldn‟t be interpreted to 
imply that legislative professionalism is going to have a negative influence on all renewable energy policies. 
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them to adopt environmental policies.
16
  Renewable energy policy has often been considered an 
environmental policy.  Therefore, conditions within each state ought to be important influences 
on the adoption of these policies.  Specifically, these analyses will control for the influences of 
state wind potential, the percent of the year with sunshine, number of nuclear power plants, 
electric energy consumption, number of public utility commission employees, and green 
conditions (Hall and Kerr 1991).   
Wind and solar are the most common sources of renewable energy.  As such, the ability 
of a state to benefit from these sources ought to be important.  Gray and Hanson (2008) have 
argued that the geography of a state has the potential to influence political behavior.  With 
renewable energy, this is particularly important since specific conditions need to be met to 
warrant building a renewable system.  Specifically, states that do not have a large capacity for 
wind energy ought to be less likely to adopt renewable policies.  Similarly, states that do not 
have a lot of sunshine throughout the year should also be less likely to adopt policies.   
Additionally, some characteristics do not fit well within the traditional social, political, 
economic, or geographic categories.  Yet, it is likely that these characteristics would influence 
policy adoption.  Nuclear energy was initially sold to the public as a cheap, clean alternative to 
coal and oil power plants (Ramey 1973).  Because of this, and the fact that most nuclear power 
plants are operating well under their maximum capacity, I expect that states with more nuclear 
power plants are going to be less likely to adopt a renewable policy.  I also anticipate that states 
with higher levels of energy consumption will be more likely to turn to clean, renewable energy 
as alternative to coal and oil power, which will cause them to be more likely to adopt a policy.  
Public utility commissions are generally expected to facilitate coordination between 
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 While applying specifically to environmental politics, there is no reason by believe that this same conditions are 
not important for a wide variety of policy arenas. 
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governmental entities and society.  Therefore, I expect that states with higher numbers of public 
utility commission employees will be better able to facilitate this coordination, and states will be 
more likely to adopt policies because the resources will already be in place to help implement the 
new policy.  Finally, Hall and Kerr (1991) find that environmental conditions vary greatly 
between states on a host of factors.  As such, states with higher green condition scores ought to 
be more likely to adopt renewable energy policies because they should be less concerned with 
other environmental problems. 
An additional set of control variables are designed to account for the influence of the 
national government on state policy adoption.  Studies into vertical influence diffusion have 
found that the national government has a history of causing states to react, and adopt their own 
policies in response (e.g. Allen, Pettus and Haider-Markel 2004; Gray 1994; Grogan 1999; Soss 
et al. 2001; Welch and Thompson 1980).  Diffusion in these instances tends to occur relatively 
quickly, particularly when there are incentives involved (Welch and Thompson 1980).   
To what extent has the national government‟s activity in renewable energy influence 
states to adopt policies?  Similar to state policies, it is hard to predict how national policies have 
influenced states.  It is also possible that these policies are equally likely to have a positive 
impact as they are to have a negative impact.  Again, the adoption of a federal policy may cause 
states to rethink adopting their own policy because the national government has already done so.  
On the other hand, it is also possible that this could serve as a sign that the state needs to get 
more involved in renewable energy.  Unfortunately, it is difficult to predict how each of these 
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policies is going to influence the states when they consider the adoption of their policies.  
Therefore, the expectation is that they will simply have an influence.
17
 
Recall, two sets of models will be analyzed for each policy, a traditional set of models 
and an expanded set of models.  The traditional set of models will all include the diffusion 
measure, estimated trend variable, internal determinants, and issue specific variables.  These 
models will also control for the influence of Renewable Portfolio Standards.  As described, this 
policy ought to represent a clear commitment to renewable energy by a state, and ought to be 
associated with the adoption of additional policies.  The expanded set of models will use all of 
these variables, plus all of the national policies and the remainder of the state policies.  If the 
traditional model is sufficient to estimate policy adoption, we should expect little differences 
between these and the expanded models.  However, if the traditional model is not optimal, then 
we should see several differences between the models.   
Estimation Concerns 
As mentioned, the inclusion of up to thirty-four yearly dummy variables would create 
estimation concerns.  Conventional statistical wisdom suggests that as long as your model has a 
large number of cases, you should not have to worry much about estimation problems due to a 
lack of degrees of freedom.  Essentially, the larger one‟s n, the more variables the statistical 
model can handle.  However, there appears to be one clear exception to this general rule.  When 
working with rare event data, the statistical models can become overwhelmed by a large number 
of variables even if there is a large n.  Simply put, there isn‟t enough variation within the 
dependent variable to handle estimating large models because there are very few actual events in 
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 Because several of the independent variables cannot have hypothesized directions for their relationships, all of the 
models will use a two-tailed test. 
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the dataset.  I observed estimation problems for every policy when yearly dummy variables were 
included.  Therefore the trend approach was necessary.   
The lack of variation in the dependent variable created a few additional concerns.  I found 
the first problem during the estimation process itself.  Often, when there were problems, the 
statistical software was unable to fit the comparison model because the log-likelihood was “not 
concave.”  This meant that the software was unable to even begin to estimate coefficients, even 
after several thousand iterations.  This problem presented itself even after all of the yearly 
dummy variables were reduced down to the single trend variable.  To overcome this problem, 
when it appeared, variables were added one at a time to the analysis.  If a variable caused the 
log-likelihood to become “not concave,” previously added variables would be removed to 
determine if the problem variable was the new variable, or a combination of variables.  In every 
circumstance where this occurred, the variable that was added when the problem occurred was 
the culprit, and it was removed from the analysis.  For reasons that are unknown, one variable in 
particular, the national Modified Accelerated Cost-Recovery System policy, resulted in the log-
likelihood problem in almost every model it was included, which is why it will only be presented 
in a couple of models. 
I uncovered a second estimation problem in the output produced by the program.  In the 
estimation of some of the more rare policies, the coefficient estimates for a variable or two 
would be nonexistent.  In this situation, estimates would be present for all of the variables except 
one or two, which would have blanks.  The same variables were blank when the analysis was 
replicated with an identical command and when the independent variables were rearranged.  A 
procedure similar to the previous was used to determine if there was some sort of variable 
interaction problem, or if it was the variable itself that was causing a problem.  In all instances, 
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everything pointed to that particular variable creating a problem, so it was removed from the 
analysis.   
The third estimation problem was that some variables contained standard errors that were 
so large that it influenced the estimation of other variables.  Some variables had standard errors 
that were in the upper thousands, and usually associated with p-values of .999.  Again, when 
trying to determine what was causing this, it was found that when the variable was removed, it 
would almost always result in significant changes to the estimates of the other variables.
18
  
However, the removal of other variables never had a significant impact on the estimation of these 
variables.  Because of this, these variables were also removed from the analyses.  It should be 
noted that when the inclusion of these variables did not have a discernable impact on any of the 
other variables, they were left in the analysis. 
The final estimation problem was associated with over-specified models.  This was a 
large problem with the more rare policies.  This problem presented itself through statistically 
insignificant Wald Chi
2
 estimates.  The Wald Chi
2
 tests the hypothesis that at least one of the 
independent variables is significantly different than zero (Greene 2008).  If this test is not 
statistically significant, then that means that none of the coefficient estimates are significantly 
different than zero, even if the estimate itself is statistically significant.  In short, without a 
significant Wald Chi
2
, none of the coefficient estimates really mean anything.  Therefore, it was 
essential to systematically remove variables from the analysis until the Wald Chi
2
 was 
statistically significant. 
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 While the removal of these variables influenced other variables in the model, it did not correct for the problems 
associated in the first two types of estimation problems. 
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The removal of variables from the analysis was accomplished using Goodness-of-Fit 
tests.
19
  A Goodness-of-Fit test is usually used to identify the model that fits the data best through 
identifying which interactions help explain the data, and which do not help as much (Agresti 
1996).  In this situation, it was not used to identify how complex our interactions need to be.  
Instead, by using the Likelihood-Ratio statistic, G
2
, and Pearson statistic, χ 2, the variables that 
best fit the model are able to be identified, thus leaving the analysis with the model that best fits 
the data.
20
  The model fit was determined by comparing the G
2
 and χ2 of each possible 
combination of variables.
21
  The larger the values of the G
2
 and χ2, the worse the model fit 
(Agresti 1996).  Therefore, the variable that decreased the G
2
 and χ2 the least was removed.  
After each round of Goodness-of-Fit tests, the cross-sectional time-series model was re-estimated 
without the variable that was identified as having the least influence on model fit.  If the Wald 
Chi
2
 was still not statistically significant, this process was continued until a usable model 
resulted.  While this is not the most desirable manner in which to estimate statistical analyses, it 
was necessary to arrive at models that were best able to explain policy adoption. 
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 Recall, the intent of this project is to obtain the most complete understanding of renewable energy policymaking 
as possible.  The analyses are not intending to show that any particular variable is important.  As such, relying upon 
a systematic approach to removal allows for the most non-arbitrary manner of identifying variables for removal.   
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21
 A Goodness-of-Fit test was run for each combination of variables.  Beginning with a baseline test with all of the 
variables, this means that the test was run with all of the variables except for one to determine the G
2
 and χ 2.  The 
next test was run with a different variable removed and the previous variable added back to the model. 
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Summary 
Building from the literature outlined in Chapter 2, this chapter established the analytical 
approach that I will use to examine the adoption of state renewable energy policies.  Briefly, the 
analyses will be cross-sectional time-series analyses using the complementary log-log 
distribution because of its superior ability to model rare events.  The models are designed to 
account for the three core components identified in Chapter 2.  Additionally, the methods 
outlined are designed to arrive at the most complete understanding of state renewable energy 
policy adoption.  To illustrate that this is a desirable approach to examining adoption, 
comparisons will be made between a traditional examinations and an expanded analyses, and 
five competing explanations of policy learning will be modeled to identify the best specified 
model of adoption.  The analyses that follow will be divided between the adoption of state 
financial incentive policies, Chapter 4, and state rules and regulations, Chapter 5, that are all 
designed to encourage the construction of renewable energy systems.   
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Chapter 4: 
Incentivizing Renewable Energy:  
The Adoption of Financial Incentive Policies 
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Currently, states have adopted eleven different types of incentive policies.  Each type of 
policy generally attempts to influence renewable energy in a specific manner.  While there may 
be some similarities between policy types, each type is distinctly different from the others.  For 
instance, corporate and personal tax incentives are quite similar in many respects, mostly 
because they offer the same basic incentive.  However, they differ in one important manner in 
that they can only be accessed by a specific class of clientele.  Because some states specifically 
adopted policies that only applied to corporations and others that only applied to individuals, it is 
appropriate to treat them as different types of policies. 
These eleven policy types can be grouped into three categories – tax incentives, 
production support, and state-backed financing.  Tax incentive policies allow the owner of a 
renewable energy resource to deduct certain costs from their taxes.  Some of these policies are 
one-time only incentives that can only be applied in the year of purchase or construction, while 
others can be used every year.   
Production support takes three basic forms.  The first are tax write-offs based on actual 
energy production.  Next, some states offer rebates that can be claimed following the 
construction of a renewable.  Finally, states have begun to offer financial support to encourage 
the production of renewable systems, with the expectation that this will both create jobs and 
increase the use of the renewable within the state. 
State-backed financing allows the state to provide funding for the construction of 
renewable systems.  These take three forms.  First, a state can offer loans at low interest rates.  
Second, some states offer large grants of money to help facilitate the purchasing and/or 
construction of renewable systems.  The third option is for the state to issue bonds that are 
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backed by the state on behalf of a corporation.  Usually, these policies are mutually exclusive, 
preventing an entity from taking advantage of more than one incentive. 
Analyses of these policies will begin with tax incentives and end with state-backed 
financing.  Each policy will contain both a traditional and expanded analyses.  As noted in 
Chapter 3 my strategy of analysis is intended to illustrate that the traditional approach may be 
underspecified, thus negatively influencing the accuracy of our analyses.  The analysis of each 
policy will begin with the traditional approach followed by the expanded.  Additionally, because 
it is difficult to identify what form of diffusion may best explain policy adoption, I will analyze 
five competing measures.  To determine which offers the best specified model I perform 
Davidson-MacKinnon tests (Davidson and MacKinnon 1993).
22
  The measure of diffusion that 
allows for the best specified model should best explain how states learn from one another, and 
will be the analysis discussed for each policy.  Unless there are significant differences in the 
other models I will not provide a detailed discussion of their results. 
Tax Incentive Policies 
 Tax incentive policies are probably the most recognized financial incentive that states 
offer.  They come in five basic varieties – corporate, personal, sales, property, and excise.  Below 
I model each policy separately (see Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of the methods 
employed). 
Corporate Tax Incentives 
Corporate tax incentives tend to be created with renewable energy facilities in mind.  
These are often used for large projects, such as a wind farm.  States have adopted several 
different varieties of these incentives.  Some of the policies apply to very specific situations, 
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 From this point on, the Davidson-MacKinnon test (Davidson and MacKinnon 1993) will be abbreviated DMT.  
Any reference to DMT is a reference to the Davidson-MacKinnon test. 
54 
 
while others are far more general.  Figure 4.1 illustrates the adoption of state corporate tax 
incentives over time.  
Beginning with the traditional approach to examining policy adoption, the results of the 
traditional models of the adoption of state corporate tax incentives can be found in Table 4.1.  
Using a DMT, the EPA Hybrid measure of diffusion was identified as providing the best 
explanation of policy learning.  The model fit statistics for this analysis indicate that the model 
performs well.   
The results reveal that the only variable in the traditional model that has a statistically 
significant influence was electric energy consumption.  This indicates that states that consume 
more energy are more likely to adopt a corporate tax incentive.  The trend variable also reveals 
that without the inclusion of this control the hazard rate would have been biased.
23
  In general,   
                                                 
23
 See Chapter 3 for a discussion of the hazard rate. 
Figure 4.1: State Adoption of Corporate Tax Incentive Policies, 
1974-2008 
 
Source: Compiled by the author based upon state adoption of its first corporate tax incentive policy 
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56 
 
the traditional model does little to help us understand what influences a state to adopt a corporate 
tax incentive.  Will the expanded model offer a better explanation? 
The expanded analyses of corporate tax incentives are presented in Table 4.2.  The DMT 
indicates that the neighbor hybrid measure of diffusion provides the best explanation of 
corporate tax incentive policy adoption.  The model fit statistics indicate that the model performs 
well.  These results also suggest that the traditional models were in fact underspecified.  Indeed, 
three of the variables included from the traditional model are now significantly influencing 
adoption.  This suggests that the expanded model is able to clarify the way each variable 
influences corporate tax incentive adoption. 
The results indicate that states that have more liberal citizenries, less yearly sunshine, 
fewer nuclear power plants, and higher electrical energy consumption are more likely to have 
adopted a corporate tax incentive policy.  The analysis of the influence of existing policies also 
provides a look into positive and negative feedbacks.  The results suggest that states that had 
already adopted a personal tax incentive, sales tax incentive, industry support, and net metering 
policies were more likely to adopt a corporate tax incentive.  All four of these policies indicate 
that there may be a positive feedback associated with the adoption of these policies.  The trend 
variable also reveals that the hazard rate would again have been biased.  However, it is worth 
noting that the z-score for the trend variable has dropped from 3.578 to 1.656, which indicates 
that a better specified model may decrease the likelihood of duration dependence.   
These analyses also reveal the importance of modeling more than one version of 
diffusion.  The measure of diffusion that was best specified changed between the traditional and 
expanded models.  Note, in both sets of models, it is the hybrid model that best explains 
adoption.  However, in neither the traditional nor expanded analyses were the best specified  
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models statistically significantly better specified than the others.  While at first glance, this may 
suggest that the actual measure used isn‟t important, a closer examination of the results 
illustrates the importance of reporting the best model possible.   
Looking closely across the alternative estimates, there are several discrepancies in the 
results.  For instance, if the leader-laggard measure was reported, the measure of the percent of 
the year a state has sunshine would not be statistically significant, and public benefits funds 
would be.  These are two incorrect estimations that rely upon a sub-optimal representation of 
diffusion.  If the EPA hybrid approach were still the best, then sales tax incentives would no 
longer be significant.  The same is true for public benefits funds within the original EPA model.   
Personal Tax Incentives 
Personal tax incentive policies are similar to corporate tax incentives except that they 
apply only to privately, produced renewable energy.  Like corporate incentives, some policies 
apply to very specific situations, such as only solar power.  As before, the analyses that follow 
will begin with a traditional model, and conclude with an expanded model.  An illustration of 
state adoption of personal tax incentives over time can be found in Figure 4.2.  
The results of the traditional model of state adoption of personal tax incentives can be 
found in Table 4.3.  The DMT indicates that the neighbor hybrid measure of diffusion provides 
the best specified estimation of the impact of diffusion.  Unlike the corporate tax incentive 
model, the traditional model for personal tax incentives provides a fairly strong explanation of 
what may influence a state to adopt these policies.  Indeed, the data suggests that states with 
higher per capita tax revenue, higher percentage of the year with sunshine, and greater green 
conditions are more likely to have adopted personal tax incentive policies to promote renewable 
60 
 
energy.  As before, the trend variable suggests that the hazard rate would become biased if the 
model did not contain a control for duration dependence.   
The expanded model of personal tax incentive policy adoption can be found in Table 4.4.  
The DMT clearly indicates that the measure for leader-laggard diffusion produces the best 
specified model.  The model fit statistics indicate that the model performs well.  These results 
also provide a much better understanding of personal tax incentive policy adoption than the 
traditional model.  Also, the trend variable suggests that the hazard rate would have been 
unstable in its absence. 
The estimations indicate that states with higher per capita tax revenue, more conservative 
citizen ideology, a larger percentage of the year with sunshine, more nuclear power plants, and 
less electrical energy consumption are more likely to adopt personal tax incentives.  The data 
also reveal that the activities of the national government also influence state adoption of these 
policies.  Following the adoption of the national production incentive program, states were more  
Figure 4.2: State Adoption of Personal Tax Incentive Policies, 
1974-2008 
 
Source: Compiled by the author based upon state adoption of its first personal tax incentive policy 
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likely to adopt personal incentives.  However, following the adoption of the USDA Rural Energy 
Program the states that had not yet adopted personal tax incentive policies became less likely to 
do so.  It is probable that this is a direct reaction to the individual-level incentives found in this 
program, which may have caused states to feel that they didn‟t need to adopt a redundant policy. 
The analysis also reveals that the adoption of other renewable energy policies influenced 
the likelihood of adopting a personal tax incentive.  Interestingly, these results indicate that there 
can be both a positive and negative feedback from the adoption of other policies in a policy 
arena.  Not surprisingly, when a state has adopted a corporate tax incentive, they are also much 
more likely to adopt a personal tax incentive.  This may suggest that many of these states may 
have adopted the personal tax incentive to satisfy critics.  Unexpectedly, the results indicate that 
states that have already adopted sales tax incentives and renewable portfolio standards are less 
likely to adopt personal tax incentives.  Perhaps the negative influence of sales tax incentives 
indicates that these policies may have been intended to serve as an incentive for corporations and 
not individuals.  A bit more perplexing is the negative relationship between renewable portfolio 
standards and adoption.  It is possible that state legislatures have recognized that individual-level 
incentives will only have a minimal impact towards achieving the goals outlined in their 
renewable portfolio standards, and have decided to focus on supporting large-scale renewable 
energy projects instead. 
The results illustrate the need for policy scholars to consider modeling the many possible 
influences of diffusion.  The comparison between a traditional approach to understanding policy 
adoption to the expanded analyses reveal that the best specified model, based on the different 
measures of diffusion, changed in the expanded analysis.  This suggests that the expanded 
analysis is providing a much clearer picture of policy adoption, which allows the influence of 
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diffusion to be better estimated.  Moreover, the leader-laggard measure in the expanded models 
creates a significantly better specified model than the four alternative measures.   
An examination of the leader-laggard model compared to the others reveals that the 
estimations from this model differ greatly from the others.  The better specified leader-laggard 
model reveals that tax revenue per capita, citizen ideology, sales tax incentives and renewable 
portfolio standards have a statistically significant influence on adoption, while none of these 
variables were statistically significant in any of the other four models.  Furthermore, the national 
production incentive program was significant in two of the other four models.  Additionally, 
three models identify property tax incentives as having a significant influence and all four 
suggest public benefits funds were important, but neither of these was found to have a 
statistically significant influence when estimated in the best specified model.  In short, the use of 
any of the other models would have resulted in less accurate estimations because these analyses 
were all significantly worse specified than the leader-laggard model. 
Sales Tax Incentives 
Many states have adopted sales tax incentives to help encourage the purchase of 
renewable resources within the state.  These policies vary in several ways, but perhaps the most 
important is that most of these incentives can only be used if the renewable source was 
purchased within the state.  This can make it difficult to actually use this incentive because the 
purchase of many of these systems requires working directly with an out-of-state manufacturer 
and not a retailer within the state.  Analyses of policy adoption will begin with the traditional 
models and will be followed by expanded models.  Figure 4.3 displays the adoption of state sales 
tax incentives over time. 
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Table 4.5 presents the results of the traditional adoption models of state sales tax 
incentive adoption.  The DMT reveals that the leader-laggard measure model provides the best 
specified model.  The DMT also reveals that this measure is statistically significantly better than 
either of the EPA measures, and is comparatively better than the neighbor measures.  The model 
fit statistics indicate that the model performs well.  The model indicates that states that have 
higher per capita tax revenue, higher levels of population density, more conservative citizens, 
and have already adopted a renewable portfolio standard are more likely to adopt a sales tax 
incentive.  Additionally, the data reveal that without a trend variable, the hazard rate would have 
become unstable. 
The results of the expanded state sales tax incentive adoption model are presented in 
Table 4.6.  Until now, the DMT has revealed that the expanded models have clarified the 
analysis in such a way that a different measure of diffusion provides a better specified model.  
However, for sales tax incentives, the DMT still suggests that the leader-laggard measure  
Figure 4.3: State Adoption of Sales Tax Incentive Policies,  
1974-2008 
 
Source: Compiled by the author based upon state adoption of its first sales tax incentive policy 
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provides the best specification for adoption.  Again, this is significantly better than either EPA 
measure and comparatively better than the neighbor measures.  The model fit statistics indicate 
that the model performs well. 
The expanded model reveals that states with higher per capita tax revenues, higher levels 
of population density, and more conservative citizens are more likely to adopt a sales tax 
incentive.  However, the expanded analysis is now able to more accurately estimate the 
relationship between the percentage of the year a state has sunshine and adoption, revealing that 
states with more sunshine are more likely to adopt.  The results also indicate that states are 
reacting positively to the actions of the national government.  Indeed, states were more likely to 
adopt following the national government adopting their production incentive program and the 
Business Energy Tax Credit.   
As the previous expanded models have illustrated, the existence of similar policies can 
influence the likelihood of adopting a sales tax incentive.  Specifically, the data suggest that 
states that have adopted an excise tax incentive and required green power were more likely to 
adopt.  Interestingly, the expanded model suggests that renewable portfolio standards in the 
traditional model were reflecting something other than these policies since they are no longer 
significantly likely to influence adoption.  Additionally, the expanded model not only provides a 
model that is better specified, it also removes the duration dependence that was found in the 
traditional model, as illustrated by the trend variable. 
A comparison between the different models reconfirms the need to ensure that adoption 
models are properly measuring diffusion.  Although misspecification is less prevalent in the sales 
tax models than in the personal tax models, there are differences that would lead to inaccurately 
identifying what influences adoption.  For example, in the four alternative models, the data  
69 
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indicates that better green conditions increases the likelihood of adoption, while having 
previously adopted a property tax incentive decreases the likelihood.  In both instances, using a 
model that wasn‟t specified as well would have lead to misleading results.   
Property Tax Incentives 
Many states have adopted property tax incentives in hope of providing a long-term 
incentive to invest in renewable energy.  Unlike most incentive policies, property tax incentives 
can be used every year.  However, these policies vary in their definition of exactly what 
qualifies.  Some states allow the value of the renewable systems that are on the land to be 
deducted, while other simply allow for a deduction in the value of the land itself.  A visualization 
of the adoption of state property tax incentives can be found in Figure 4.4. 
The results of the traditional model of the adoption of state property tax incentives can be 
found in Table 4.7.  The DMT suggests that the EPA regional diffusion measure provides the 
best specified measure of adoption.  In fact, the DMT reveals that the EPA measure is  
Figure 4.4: State Adoption of Property Tax Incentive Policies, 
1974-2008 
 
Source: Compiled by the author based upon state adoption of its first property tax incentive policy 
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statistically significantly better specified than all four of the other measures.  The model fit 
statistics suggest that the model performs well.   
The results of the analysis indicate that states with lower tax revenue per capita, more 
conservative government ideology, more liberal citizen ideology, greater wind potential, and 
have adopted renewable portfolio standards are more likely to adopt property tax incentives.  
Interestingly, the data also suggests that as states within an EPA region adopted property tax 
policies the remaining states were less likely to adopt.  Typically, it is expected that diffusion 
will have a positive influence (Mooney 2001), but in this situation, the results actually suggest 
the opposite.   
The expanded models of property tax incentive policy adoption are presented in Table 
4.8.  As found in the sales tax models, the DMT reveals that the EPA regional measure offers the 
best specified models of adoption.  The DMT also finds that the EPA model significantly fits the 
data better than either neighbor or the leader-laggard models.  The model fit statistics indicate 
that the model performs well. 
The results indicate that an expanded model can provide a more nuanced explanation of 
policy adoption than the traditional model.  The results also suggest that states with lower per 
capita tax revenue, higher wind potential, and fewer nuclear power plants are more likely to 
adopt property tax incentives.  Interestingly, the expanded analysis reveals that government 
ideology and citizen ideology no longer have a statistically significant influence on adoption.  
Furthermore, the results suggest that states that had already adopted a state-backed grant program 
and industry support policies were more likely to adopt a property tax incentive.  Again, the 
results suggest that as states within an EPA region adopt property tax incentives the remaining 
states become less likely to do so.  
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Excise Tax Exemptions 
State excise tax policies are usually associated with the production of goods that can 
physically harm the public either directly (e.g. alcohol, tobacco, etc.) or indirectly through 
pollution created during the production process (e.g. coal or oil-based electricity generation, steel 
production, chemical solvent production, etc.).  Because renewable energy is a pollution-free 
alternative to coal or oil-based energy production, many have argued that it should be exempt 
from excise taxes.  Thus far, only two states, Iowa and Massachusetts, have adopted excise tax 
exemptions.   
With only two states having adopted this policy, there is not sufficient variation within 
the dependent variable to allow for a proper statistical analysis.  If more states adopt this policy 
researchers will then be able to effectively model policy adoption.  Until that time, the current 
adoption trend is depicted in Figure 4.5. 
 
 
Figure 4.5: State Adoption of Excise Tax Incentive Policies,  
1974-2008 
 
Source: Compiled by the author based upon state adoption of its first excise tax incentive policy 
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Production Support 
Production Incentives 
State production incentives are similar to those offered in the national production 
incentive program.  While the rates vary, the basic idea is that states allow a tax deduction of 
predetermined rates for every Kilo-Watt hour or Mega-Watt hour of energy produced.  State 
production incentives are typically long-term programs that allow producers to claim the tax 
deduction for however long the program exists.  In some states, these policies are sunset laws 
similar to the program offered by the national government, but others do not have a 
predetermined end date.  To date, no state has allowed their sunset provisions to activate, and 
have adopted policies that extend the sunset provision for several years.  Figure 4.6 illustrates 
state adoption of production incentives over time. 
 
Figure 4.6: State Adoption of Production Incentive Policies,  
1974-2008 
 
Source: Compiled by the author based upon state adoption of its first production incentive policy 
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The results of the traditional model of state production incentives are presented in Table 
4.9.  The DMT suggest that the neighbor measure offers the best specified model of adoption.  
The model fit statistics suggest that the model performs well.  The data indicate that states with 
higher levels of electrical energy consumption, better green conditions, and renewable portfolio 
standards are more likely to adopt production incentive policies. 
Table 4.10 offers a look at the results of the expanded analyses of production incentive 
policy adoption.  The DMT reveals that the neighbor measure again provides the best specified 
model of adoption.  The model fit statistics for the neighbor model suggest that it performs well.  
The data reveals that states with higher levels of population density, fewer college graduates, 
more nuclear power plants, and better green conditions were more likely to adopt production 
incentive policies.  It also appears that states were more likely to adopt production incentives 
after the national government adopted its USDA Rural Energy Program. 
This analysis illustrates the importance of controlling for the adoption of other policies in 
the policy arena.  Indeed, it is clear that existing policies can both serve as positive and negative 
feedbacks toward the adoption of production incentive policies.  The results find that states that 
have adopted corporate tax incentives, renewable portfolio standards, required green power 
policies, and net metering were more likely to adopt production incentives.  On the other hand, if 
a state had adopted a personal tax incentive or a state-backed grant program, they were less 
likely to adopt production incentives. 
Similar to the results in modeling several of the other policies, the selection of the 
diffusion variable does influence our understanding of production incentive policy adoption.  For 
instance, college graduates are found to only have a statistically significant influence on adoption 
in the two neighbor models.  The leader-laggard and EPA regional models both find that  
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government ideology has a significant influence, but the other three do not.  Finally, net metering 
does not appear to have a significant influence when using either of the EPA measures.  Again, 
this highlights the need to ensure that the best measure of diffusion is modeled. 
Production Rebates 
Perhaps more so than any of the other incentive policies, production rebates are 
approached in a variety of manners by the states.  Some states allow the rebates to be taken 
advantage of more than once.  Others only allow a one-time rebate.  Some offer rebates on the 
construction costs.  Others allow a rebate on the purchase price.  Yet others offer a flat rebate the 
moment energy is actually produced.  While there are certainly differences, production rebates 
are all similar in that they offer lump sum payments from the state.  State adoption of production 
rebate policies is presented in Figure 4.7. 
The results of the traditional model are presented in Table 4.11.  The DMT suggest that 
the leader-laggard measure provides the best specified model of production rebate adoption.  The 
Figure 4.7: State Adoption of Production Rebate Policies,  
1974-2008 
 
Source: Compiled by the author based upon state adoption of its first production rebate policy 
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model fit statistics indicate that the model performs well.  The analysis suggests that states with a 
higher percentage of college graduates and more nuclear power plants are more likely to adopt 
production rebates.  The data also finds that leader states are more likely to adopt production 
rebates than laggard states. 
The expanded analyses can be found in Table 4.12.  Here, the DMT suggests that the 
EPA measure provides the best specified model of adoption.  However, it should be noted that, 
as with the traditional analysis, the difference between the EPA and leader-laggard measures are 
minimal.  In this situation, the results clearly indicate that an expanded model does little to 
clarify what influences adoption.  It does indicate that states with more college graduates and 
better green conditions are more likely to adopt.  However, these were the same results found in 
the traditional EPA model.  None of the existing policies or national policies yields a statistically 
significant influence on adoption.  The only real difference is that the expanded model is now 
able to more accurately model the influence of EPA regional diffusion, which suggests that as 
more states adopt production rebates, the remaining states are less likely to adopt their own 
policy. 
Industry Support 
States have started to adopt industry support policies as a backdoor way to incentivize 
renewable energy.  Industry support policies are an odd combination of goals that ultimately 
influence job creation, renewable energy advocacy, and renewable energy system construction.  
These policies tend to provide financial support for constructing a manufacturing plant in the 
state.  Some states offer a flat rate to help offset costs, while others offer to cover a set 
percentage of the costs up to a certain amount.  In any event, these policies are designed to create 
“green” jobs, but they can also influence the construction of renewable systems because it will be  
84 
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easier for manufacturers to meet demand with increased manufacturing.  Currently, demand for 
renewable sources is far greater than supply.  In recent years there has been up to a three year 
delay on the shipment of wind turbines from the moment an order is placed (e.g. Kanellos 2008).  
If a state is able to manufacture renewable systems in their back yard, it should be easier to meet 
demand, while simultaneously possibly increasing demand since the producer could buy the 
renewable that their neighbor built.  State adoption of industry support policies are illustrated in 
Figure 4.8. 
The results of the traditional adoption models are presented in Table 4.13.  The DMT 
suggest that the neighbor hybrid measure provides the best specified model of adoption.  The 
model fit statistics indicate that the model performs well.  The data suggests that states with 
higher per capita tax revenue and higher energy consumption are more likely to adopt an 
industry support policy. 
  
Figure 4.8: State Adoption of Industry Support Policies,  
1974-2008 
 
Source: Compiled by the author based upon state adoption of its first industry support policy 
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While the traditional approach reveals relatively little about what influences a state to 
adopt industry support policies, the expanded analysis offers much greater insight.  The results of 
the expanded models are presented in Table 4.14.  The DMT reveal that the neighbor hybrid 
measure of diffusion provides the best specified model.  In fact, it is statistically significantly 
better than all of the other models.  The model fit statistics suggest that the model performs well. 
The data suggest that states with higher per capita tax revenue, higher levels of 
population density, and fewer nuclear power plants are more likely to adopt industry support 
policies.  Interestingly, all of the expanded models reveal that electric energy consumption no 
longer has a statistically significant influence on adoption, which suggest that the traditional 
models were underspecified.  It also appears as though states have reacted to the national 
government such that they have been less likely to adopt industry support policies since the 
national government adopted its production incentive program.  Additionally, the results suggest 
that as neighbors that are leaders in environmental politics adopt policies, a state is less likely to 
adopt their own policy.  It is possible that manufacturers of renewable sources are predisposed to 
set up shop in environmentally friendly states, which could cause a neighbor state to be less 
likely to try to compete. 
Existing policies also play an important role in influencing the likelihood of adoption.  
States that have already adopted corporate tax incentives, production incentives, state-backed 
bonds, and required green power policies are more likely to adopt industry support policies.  
However, states that have adopted a sales tax incentive are less likely.  Most likely this is 
associated with the eligibility of the sales tax incentive only being able to be used if the 
renewable was purchased within the state.  If a state helps to finance the construction of a 
manufacturing plant, it would guarantee that the sales tax incentive would be used far more often  
90 
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than it would be if there wasn‟t a manufacturer.  Again, these results illustrate the importance of 
positive and negative feedback associated with the previous adoption of other policies in an 
arena. 
A comparison of the different models reveals that the choice of diffusion measure can 
impact the ability of a scholar to properly identify what influences adoption.  Both neighbor 
models reveal that population density, nuclear power plants, and the adoption of the national 
production incentive program play an important role, but none of the others find similar results.  
On the other hand, the USDA Rural Energy Program is only found to be statistically insignificant 
in the two neighbor models.  Additionally, state-backed bonds are not significant in the EPA 
regional and leader-laggard models, and required green policies are only significant in the 
neighbor hybrid and leader-laggard models.  In short, this illustrates the importance of 
identifying the best measure of a control for diffusion. 
State-Backed Financing 
State-Backed Bonds 
State-backed bond programs allow the government to raise money for the construction of 
a renewable system on behalf of a corporation.  The state issues the bonds, which are purchased 
by investors.  Under normal circumstances, the state would pay off the bonds themselves.  
However, under this type of a program the state serves as a middle-man for the corporation that 
is building the renewable.  As such, the bond is actually paid off by the corporation even though 
it was taken out under the government‟s authority.  In the event that the corporation fails to make 
payments on the bond, the government would become the owner of the renewable system.  Thus 
far, only Idaho, Illinois, and New Mexico have adopted bond policies.  However, the Illinois  
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policy wasn‟t adopted until 2009, which places it outside of the time period covered by the data.  
Figure 4.9 illustrates the adoption of state-backed bond policies over time. 
With only two states having adopted this policy, within the time period analyzed, there is 
not sufficient variation within the dependent variable to allow for a proper statistical analysis.  If 
more states adopt this policy researchers will then be able to effectively model policy adoption.   
State-Backed Grants 
Several states have adopted state-backed grant policies.  These are one-time grants of aid 
for the construction or purchase of renewable systems.  Some state-backed grants are to help 
offset the cost associated with purchasing the renewable system, while others are to be applied to 
the construction costs. Usually, these are available to both individuals and corporations.  
However, preference appears to be given to corporations.  An illustration of state adoption of 
state-backed grants can be found in Figure 4.10. 
 
Figure 4.9: State Adoption of State-Backed Bond Policies,  
1974-2008 
 
Source: Compiled by the author based upon state adoption of its first state-backed bond policy 
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Table 4.15 presents the results of traditional analyses of the adoption of state-backed 
grant policies.  The DMT finds that the leader-laggard model provides the best specified model.  
The DMT also reveals that this model is significantly better specified than the others.  The model 
fit statistics suggest that the model performs well.  The results indicate that states with more 
professional legislatures and renewable portfolio standards policies are more likely to adopt a 
state-backed grant.  Additionally, the results suggest that states that are leaders are more likely to 
adopt than states that are laggards. 
My analysis of the adoption of state-backed grants using the expanded approach reveals 
several interesting findings, which are presented in Table 4.16.  The DMT finds that the neighbor 
hybrid measure creates the best specified model.  This is interesting because this measure is 
significantly better specified than the other four, while in the traditional model the leader-laggard 
model was significantly better than the others.  The conflicting DMT findings represent the first 
time both the traditional and expanded models contained measures that resulted in significantly  
Figure 4.10: State Adoption of State-Backed Grant Policies,  
1974-2008 
 
Source: Compiled by the author based upon state adoption of its first state-backed grant policy 
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better models, but these models were not the same in both sets of analyses.  This illustrates the 
importance of exploring the adoption of a policy in this manner since the expanded analysis 
clearly allows for a much more nuanced and revealing explanation of adoption.  Moreover, the 
model fit statistics reveal that the models performed very well.  It should also be noted that only 
one of the independent variables is not included in these analyses, and it was removed because 
the two states that have adopted state-backed bonds did so after they had both adopted grants, 
which meant that the variable did not vary within the analysis. 
The results of the expanded analysis reveals that states with more professional 
legislatures, more nuclear power plants, worse green conditions, and a lower percentage of the 
year with sunshine were all more likely to adopt a state-backed grant policy.  It also appears that 
national policies have little influence over the adoption of state-backed grants.  The existence of 
previously adopted policies has a strong influence on the adoption of state-backed grants.  This 
influence appears to be stronger with state-backed grants than other policies.  The data suggest 
that states that have already adopted production rebates, excise tax incentives, renewable 
portfolio standards, required green power, and public benefits funds are more likely to adopt 
state-backed grants.  On the other hand, states that have already adopted production incentives 
and industry support policies are less likely to adopt state-backed grants.   
This analysis is the first that estimates a statistically significant, positive coefficient 
estimate for the constant.  In the previous analyses, if the constant was significant it was always 
negative.  This estimation is interesting because it suggests that the expanded analysis of state-
backed grants is better able to explain why a state would not adopt the policy than why it would.   
Following a pattern of results observed in the earlier models, the selection of diffusion 
measures influences the estimation of the data.  However, there was more consistency in the  
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models of state-backed grants than in many of the others.  The results reveal that tax revenue per 
capita is statistically significant in all of the models except the neighbor hybrid model.  Nuclear 
power plants are important in all but the basic neighbor model.  Finally, production rebates are 
only found to have a significant influence in the two neighbor models. 
State-Backed Loans 
Most states have adopted state-backed loan policies.  Although some loans are for 
construction costs, others are for purchase costs.  Still other loan programs help with the cost of 
hooking to the electrical grid.  Some states allow entities to apply for more than one type of loan.  
Because the state is backing the loan, the interest rates tend to be lower than those offered by 
private lending institutions, and it is easier to qualify because if the recipient defaults on the loan, 
the state would take ownership of the renewable system.  A visual depiction of state adoption of 
state-backed loans can be found in Figure 4.11. 
 
Figure 4.11: State Adoption of State-Backed Loan Policies,  
1974-2008 
 
Source: Compiled by the author based upon state adoption of its first state-backed loan policy 
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The results from the traditional model of the adoption of these state-backed loan 
programs can be found in Table 4.17.  The DMT suggests that the leader-laggard model is the 
best specified.  The model fit statistics indicate that the model performs well.  While this may be 
the best specified model, the model itself doesn‟t reveal much about what is influencing 
adoption.  A state was more likely to adopt a loan policy after they had adopted a renewable 
portfolio standards policy.  Interestingly, the trend variable is not significant, indicating that 
duration dependence may not create an unstable hazard rate. 
An expanded analysis of adoption clearly allows the statistical model to better estimate 
the influence of certain conditions, which suggests that the traditional model was underspecified.  
The results of the expanded analyses can be found in Table 4.18.  The DMT suggests that the 
basic neighbor diffusion measure provides the best specified model of adoption.  The model fit 
statistics for this model indicate that it performs well.  Again, the model results reveal that the 
trend variable is not significant. 
The results from the expanded model reveal that states with less per capita tax revenue, 
more college graduates, and a lower percentage of days with sunshine are more likely to adopt 
state-backed loans.  While one might be tempted to presume that a state with lower tax revues 
would be less likely to adopt a renewable energy policy, it is reasonable to presume that a state-
backed loan program would be preferred to many of the other options because the state will get 
their money back with interest as opposed to the other policies that only pay out without a direct 
return of revenue.   
The data also reveals that states were motivated by the activities of the national 
government.  Surprisingly, following the adoption of the Modified Accelerated Cost-Recovery 
System states were more likely to adopt a loan program.  Also, after the national government  
101 
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adopted its Business Energy Tax Credit, states that had not already adopted a loan policy were 
more likely to do so. 
The results also suggest that the prior adoption of other renewable energy policies 
influenced the adoption of state-backed loans.  States that had already adopted personal tax 
incentives, renewable portfolio standards, and public benefits funds were more likely to adopt a 
loan program.  The importance of public benefits funds coincides with the lower tax revenue per 
capita since the funds raised by the public benefits fund are likely to be used to issue the loans. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
In this chapter I explored the adoption of state renewable energy policy incentives.  I 
employed a universal modeling approach to allow a comparison between the adoptions of state 
renewable energy incentive policies.  Unfortunately, it was not possible to analyze every policy 
due to too few states having adopted state-backed bond and excise tax policies.  However, taken 
as a whole, the analyses reveal several important observations. 
Recall, I presented an argument that the policymaking process is an inherently complex 
process (e.g. Sabatier and Weible 2007), and that our traditional models may be underspecified, 
which can lead to improperly estimating the relationships between the independent and 
dependent variables.  These analyses assessed the validity of these concerns by estimating a 
traditional model of adoption along with an expanded model.  In nearly every set of analyses, the 
results indicated that the expanded models provided a more complete picture of the forces 
influencing policy adoption.  In several of the models, the expanded models revealed that the 
traditional model misestimated the proper influence of the variables normally included in the 
traditional model.   
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Table 4.19:   Summary of Statistically Significant Independent Variables 
  Traditional  Expanded 
  Positive Negative Total  Positive Negative Total 
Internal Determinants        
 Tax Revenue per Capita 33.3% 11.1% 44.4%  33.3% 22.2% 55.5% 
 Population Density 11.1% 0% 11.1%  33.3% 0% 33.3% 
 College Graduates 11.1% 0% 11.1%  22.2% 11.1% 33.3% 
 Government Ideology 0% 11.1% 11.1%  0% 0% 0% 
 Citizen Ideology 11.1% 11.1% 22.2%  11.1% 22.2% 33.3% 
 Legislative Professionalism 11.1% 0% 11.1%  11.1% 0% 11.1% 
         
Energy Specific Conditions        
 Wind Potential 11.1% 0% 11.1%  11.1% 0% 11.1% 
 Percent Sunshine 11.1% 0% 11.1%  22.2% 33.3% 55.5% 
 Nuclear Power Plants 11.1% 0% 11.1%  33.3% 33.3% 66.6% 
 Electric Energy Consumption 33.3% 0% 33.3%  11.1% 11.1% 22.2% 
 PUC Employees 0% 0% 0%  0% 0% 0% 
 Green Conditions 22.2% 0% 22.2%  22.2% 11.1% 33.3% 
         
National Policies        
 Production Incentive - - -  22.2% 11.1% 33.3% 
 Modified Accelerated Cost-
Recovery System 
- - -  11.1% 0% 11.1% 
 Business Energy Tax Credit - - -  22.2% 0% 22.2% 
 USDA Rural Energy Program - - -  11.1% 11.1% 22.2% 
         
State Incentive Policies        
 Corporate Tax  - - -  37.5% 0% 37.5% 
 Personal Tax  - - -  25% 12.5% 37.5% 
 Sales Tax  - - -  12.5% 25% 37.5% 
 Property Tax - - -  0% 0% 0% 
 Production Incentive - - -  12.5% 12.5% 25% 
 Production Rebate - - -  12.5% 0% 12.5% 
 Bond - - -  11.1% 0% 11.1% 
 Grant - - -  12.5% 12.5% 25% 
 Loan - - -  0% 0% 0% 
 Excise Tax - - -  22.2% 0% 22.2% 
 Industry Support - - -  25% 12.5% 37.5% 
         
State Rules & Regulations        
 Renewable Portfolio Standard 55.5% 0% 55.5%  33.3% 11.1% 44.4% 
 Green Power Purchasing - - -  0% 0% 0% 
 Required Green Power - - -  44.4% 0% 44.4% 
 Public Benefits Fund - - -  22.2% 0% 22.2% 
 Net Metering - - -  22.2% 0% 22.2% 
Note: All percentages represent the number of statistically significant results for each variable that identified in the best 
specified model for each of the nine policies, except for the variables representing the policies that were examined in this 
chapter, which were only modeled in eight analyses because they all had to be removed from their own analysis. 
 
To illustrate these differences, Table 4.19 presents a summary of the statistically 
significant independent variables that were found in the models that were best specified.  This 
summary reveals that the internal determinants and energy specific conditions were consistently 
misestimated in the traditional models, whereas the expanded models were better able to identify 
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how these variables and the dependent variable related.  For instance, the variable representing 
the number of nuclear power plants was significant in only 11.1% of the traditional models, but it 
was significant in 66.6% of the expanded models, with half of those be positive and the other 
half negative.  Certainly, our explanation of the influence of nuclear power plants on policy 
adoption would be completely different if we were to only rely on the traditional models.  The 
same can be said for the percent sunshine in each state, which went from 11.1% to 55.5%.  Even 
smaller changes are noteworthy.  For instance population density, college graduates, and citizen 
ideology all increased from 11.1% to 33.3%.  Perhaps more importantly, only three variables 
were found to have a significant negative influence on adoption in the traditional models, but the 
expanded models reveal a massive increase in significant negative influences amongst these 
variables.  This clearly indicates that the traditional model may be underspecified, and that 
adoption scholars would be better suited to consider expanding their models to better reflect the 
complexity of policy adoption.   
The results presented provide an interesting view into the dynamics of federalism.  
Recall, Gormley (1986) would suggest that renewable energy policy is an area that the national 
government ought to dominate.  However, the states have been heavily involved in adopting 
policies creating financial incentives to encourage the construction of these resources.  An 
important issue was to determine if states were motivated by national action on this topic.  As 
Table 4.19 illustrates, the analyses indicate that the states were acting primarily independent of 
national action.  In only a few policies were national policy adoption a significant influence on 
state adoption.  Nevertheless, in some instances national adoption encouraged states to adopt a 
policy.  In others, it appears as though states chose not to adopt a policy because the national 
government may have provided an incentive that was sufficient to not necessitate adoption of 
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their own.  Regardless, it seems that it would be beneficial to control for the influence of the 
national government on state policy adoption. 
These analyses should illustrate the importance of controlling for previously adopted 
policies within the policy arena.  The basic idea underlying the feedback loops that are inherent 
to every theory of policymaking is that previous behaviors are going to influence future 
behavior.  To borrow from Baumgartner and Jones (2002) previously adopted policies could be 
thought of as positive or negative feedbacks.  However, existing research rarely examines these 
relationships, with the exception of Balla (2001) and Stoutenborough and Beverlin (2008).  
These analyses attempted to fully test the influence of pre-existing policies on the adoption of a 
new policy.  As Table 4.19 reveals, not every previously adopted policy has a significant 
influence on the adoption of a different policy (i.e. property tax incentives, state-backed loans, 
and green power purchasing).  However, the cumulative results clearly suggest that existing 
policies can provide both positive and negative feedbacks.  These feedbacks tended to be 
overwhelmingly positive, which was to be expected.  However, there were clearly situations 
where the existence of a specific policy decreased the likelihood of adoption.  Certainly these 
results should encourage policy adoption scholars to model the effects of other policies in the 
policy arena. 
Another goal of these analyses was to determine if our conceptualization of diffusion 
influenced the analyses.  Rarely is it clear prior to analyzing adoption how states learn from one 
another.  It was expected that there were many equally plausible explanations, and that the only 
way to know for certain which best represents policy learning was to model each in a competing 
measures.  Using a Davidson-MacKinnon test, I was able to fit each model into the others to 
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determine which measure of diffusion created the best specified model.
24
  Table 4.20 presents the 
breakdown of best measure of diffusion for each policy and type of model. 
Interestingly, this approach revealed that learning about renewable energy incentive 
policies followed several paths, and that these paths were rarely statistically significant.  While 
individually none of these results are wholly inconsistent with previous research using diffusion, 
it is remarkable that in the eighteen separate analyses discussed, the control for diffusion was 
only significant in seven – three in the traditional models and four in the expanded models.  This 
is interesting primarily because we typically expect that diffusion is occurring (Mooney 2001).  
Fascinatingly, of these seven, four were a negative relationship.  This relationship is normally 
expected to be positive (Mooney 2001), but some have found a negative relationship (e.g. Hays 
and Glick 1997).   
Table 4.20 reveals a very interesting pattern in the results.  In every instance when the 
EPA appears to have inserted itself into the process the EPA region diffusion variable was 
statistically significant and in a negative direction.  But why would this be?  As noted, there have 
been EPA regions that have had confrontational relationships with its member states (e.g. 
O‟Leary and Raines 2001), but it isn‟t clear exactly why this would cause a state to be less likely 
                                                 
24
 See Chapter 3 for an explanation of this procedure. 
Table 4.20:  Summary of Diffusion Measures and Model Specification 
 Traditional Models  Expanded Models 
 Best 
Modela 
DMT 
Significantb 
Estimate 
Significantc 
Estimate 
Negatived 
 Best 
Modela 
DMT 
Significantb 
Estimate 
Significantc 
Estimate 
Negatived 
EPA 1 1 1 1  2 1.75 2 2 
EPA Hybrid 1 0 0 n/a  0 n/a n/a n/a 
Neighbor 1 0 0 n/a  2 0 0 n/a 
Neighbor Hybrid 2 0 0 n/a  3 1 1 1 
Leader-Laggard 4 2.5 2 0  2 1.5 1 0 
Notes: 
a: The number of times each measure of diffusion was identified as the measure that provided the best specified model 
b: The number of times the Davidson-MacKinnon Test identified the measure as being statistically significantly better that the other measures.  If a 
measure was not significantly better than all four measures, a decimal was added to represent the percent of that it was significantly better. 
c: The number of times the best specified measure resulted in a statistically significant coefficient estimate.   
d: The number of times a significant result was negative. 
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to adopt a policy if the learning appears to be facilitated by these regional offices.   If anything, 
this would suggest that the EPA regional offices would be less likely to influence these states.   
Another possibility is that the EPA is somehow administering the process of providing 
states with the resources to back some of their incentives, and that this administration process is 
complicated, which would make the EPA less enthusiastic about encouraging states to adopt 
these policies because it would create more work for these regional offices.  Certainly, the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 provides several grant opportunities that 
would allow states to use federal funding to cover the cost of their incentive, and that several 
state have taken advantage of these grants in 2009 and 2010 by adopting policies that are funded 
through these grants.  However, I am unable to find a link between production rebates and 
property tax incentives and federal grants that may be administered by the EPA.  This doesn‟t 
mean that they are not there, but that I cannot find them.  Given data limitations these are simply 
open questions that await future analysis. 
When conceptualizing diffusion in several different manners, it is expected that not all of 
the policies will spread in the same manner.  It is possible that certain policies are more likely to 
follow a leader-laggard approach, while others may be spread through the assistance of the EPA.  
Despite all of the policies examined thus far generally falling under the category of renewable 
energy incentive policies, the method of policy learning within the states varied greatly.  As 
Table 4.20 illustrates, clearly diffusion is not consistent within a policy arena.  This suggests that 
policy scholars should not rely solely on the results of previous policy research in a policy arena 
to determine what type of diffusion should be modeled.  Moreover, of the eight policies 
examined, the measure of diffusion that presented the best specified model changed five times, 
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suggesting that better models can drastically alter estimations.  Together, these results suggest 
that this approach to identifying the best measure ought to be used by policy scholars. 
Finally, although it was not always the case, several models revealed that one form of 
measuring diffusion created models that were statistically significantly better specified than the 
others.  When this occurred, there can be no doubt that that particular measure was the best.  In 
seven of the eighteen models, the DMT reveals that one measure of diffusion created a model 
that was significantly better specified than the four others.  Two measures were significantly 
better than two of the four alternatives.  In both of these situations, the other two were close to 
being statistically significantly better.  Finally, one measure was significantly better than three of 
the four, with the exception being the hybrid version of the measure.  This is important to note 
because more than half of the eighteen models resulted in a measure that created a model that 
significantly better specified than the others.  If any of the other options were used, it would have 
resulted in inaccurate estimations.  It is also interesting to note that all four of the significant 
negative estimates for the diffusion controls were associated with models that were significantly 
better specified than the alternatives.  In the remaining situations, the best model was only 
comparatively the best. 
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Chapter 5: 
Regulating Renewable Energy:  
The Adoption of State Rules and Regulations 
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States have been quite active legislating renewable energy.  Because this is an inherently 
complex issue (Gormley 1986), there ought to be a number of rules and regulations that are 
needed to overcome the litany of technological, political, and unforeseen delays that prevent a 
policy from achieving its legislative goal (Kraft and Vig 2005).  Accordingly, states have begun 
to adopt rules that aid in promoting renewable energy and regulations that are designed to 
overcome some of these concerns.  For the most part, the public knows little about these policies, 
but they prove to be essential to promoting renewable energy. 
To fully understand state renewable energy, it is necessary to analyze these rules and 
regulations.  Are the same influences that shaped the likelihood of a state to adopt a financial 
incentive policy in play with these policies?  Are these policies more reactive in nature?  In other 
words, are they adopted following the adoption of an incentive policy to facilitate the success of 
the incentive? 
The analyses of state rules and regulations that follow are operationalized using the same 
methodology outlined in Chapter 3.  As noted in earlier chapters, my strategy of analysis is to 
allow for comparisons across policies, in addition to simply understanding what influenced the 
likelihood of adoption for each policy.  As before, a traditional model and an expanded model 
are estimated using five alternative explanations for policy diffusion.  Will the estimation 
differences uncovered in the analyses of financial incentive policies continue to be present when 
examining the adoption of state rules and regulations? 
Rules Promoting Renewable Energy 
Of these peripheral policies, the rules that promote renewable energy tend to generate the 
most attention.  These tend to be the most visible and often the most controversial of the non-
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financial incentive policies.  These are also the policies that one would expect would have the 
most recognizable influence on the construction of renewable energy.   
Renewable Portfolio Standards 
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) are designed to push a states electrical energy 
production in the direction of renewable energy.  An RPS generally establishes goals for energy 
production that identify the desired percentage of the electrical energy that should come from 
renewable systems.  As one might expect, some states have set more lofty goals than others, but 
the end result has generally been an increase in renewable energy in the states that have adopted 
these policies (Wiser et al. 2007).   
RPS policies are generally considered to be relatively uncontroversial (Rabe 2007).  
Policymakers have the luxury of touting the benefits of RPS without any serious drawbacks.  
RPS encourages the further development of renewable systems, which lead to “green” jobs, 
cleaner air, and possibly the establishment of the industry that builds these systems (i.e. Mastrull 
2010) all at no direct cost to the taxpayers because the energy companies are responsible for the 
investment in the infrastructure.  Upon closer examination, this argument isn‟t completely 
truthful since many of the state‟s financial incentives will help finance this development and it is 
probable that energy costs will go up as well, but that doesn‟t seem to dissuade support of an 
investment in renewable energy. 
While in principle RPS is generally supported by the public and policymakers, the 
policies themselves tend to have little bite.  RPS may establish goals, which tend to be popular, 
but they typically do not have an enforcement mechanism.  There is little a state can do if its 
goals are not met.  Usually, RPS do not contain language that would allow the state to force 
utilities to invest in renewable energy, although it is possible that these policies could open the  
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state to litigation challenges if the goals are not met.  It is thought that competition, public 
opinion, and financial incentives would provide the necessary enticement for action.  Indeed, 
some energy producers allow their customers to request energy that was specifically created by 
renewable systems, usually at a premium, even though it is impossible to control the source of 
the energy entering a building.  Figure 5.1 illustrates the adoption of RPS policies over time. 
Traditional analyses examining the adoption of RPS can be found in Table 5.1.  The 
Davidson-Mackinnon Test (DMT) reveals that the measure of neighbor diffusion provides the 
best specified model of adoption.  The DMT also finds that this measure created a model that 
was statistically significantly better specified than the other four.  The model fit statistics indicate 
that the model performs well.  The results reveal that states with a higher percentage of college 
graduates, more liberal citizens, greater wind potential, higher levels of electric energy 
consumption, and fewer public utility commission employees are more likely to have adopted  
Figure 5.1: State Adoption of Renewable Portfolio Standards 
Policies, 1974-2008 
 
Source: Compiled by the author based upon state adoption of its first renewable portfolio standards 
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RPS.  The findings also indicate that a non-adopter is much more likely to adopt as other states 
that share their border adopt. 
What influence, if any, will the existence of other policies concerning renewable energy 
have on the adoption of RPS?  An expanded set of analyses are presented in Table 5.2.  The 
DMT finds that the neighbor measure of diffusion continues to provide the best specified model 
of adoption.  Again, this measure provides a model that is statistically significantly better 
specified than the others.  The model fit statistics indicate that the model performs well. 
The model estimates indicate that states with lower per capita tax revenue, more liberal 
citizens, greater wind potential, more sunshine, and fewer public utility commission employees 
are more likely to adopt a RPS.  Notably, the expanded model reveals two new state 
characteristics, tax revenue and percent sunshine, as having an important impact on adoption, 
and reveals that two others, college graduates and electric energy consumption, may not have the 
influence revealed in the traditional model.
25
  The analysis also finds that states were more likely 
to adopt following the national government adopting its Business Energy Tax Credit. 
The model estimates also reveal that states are still more likely to adopt as more of their 
neighbors adopt their own RPS.  Interestingly, despite fairly widespread adoption, the results 
indicate that the expanded model was able to better account for what was influencing adoption, 
and that the trend variable is no longer statistically significant, which suggests that the expanded 
model removes the threat of an unstable hazard rate.
26
 
The results also indicate that existing policy action within a state influenced the 
likelihood of adoption.  The analysis indicates that states were more likely to adopt a RPS if they  
                                                 
25
 Tax revenue per capita was removed from the traditional model for reasons outlined in the first estimation concern 
found in Chapter 3.  When included in the traditional model, tax revenue prevented the statistical software from 
being able to fit a comparison model.  When the model was expanded, the tax revenue variable did not create any 
estimation concerns. 
26
 The hazard rate is discussed in Chapter 3. 
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had already adopted a sales tax incentive, property tax incentive, production incentive, 
production rebate, state-backed grant, state-backed loan, green power purchasing, required green 
power, or a net metering policy.  It also finds that states that had adopted a personal tax incentive 
were less likely to adopt RPS.  Certainly, it appears that RPS were adopted to encourage 
renewable energy in a new manner.  It appears that this may be a reaction to the incentive 
policies and other rules and regulations may not have been doing enough to achieve their 
legislative goals.  Regardless, it is clear that existing policies have influenced the adoption of 
RPS. 
In addition to differences between the traditional and expanded analyses, the selection of 
a control for diffusion also has an impact on our ability to understand what influences policy 
adoption.  For instance, using the EPA hybrid measure, one would find that college graduates 
have a significant impact, but this is the only measure that finds this relationship.  The existence 
of sales tax policies having a significant influence are found in both neighbor measures, but not 
the others.  The neighbor measure is the only to find that state-backed grants have a significant 
influence.  A comparison finds that using the leader-laggard measure would improperly estimate 
the influence of production rebates.  In short, the results again illustrate that it is essential that we 
use the best measure of diffusion if we want to truly understand adoption. 
Green Power Purchasing 
Several states have adopted green power purchasing policies.  These policies require that 
state owned facilities purchase a certain percentage of their power from renewable systems.  
These policies are designed to achieve two goals.  First, it stands as a demonstration of a states 
commitment toward renewable energy through this purchasing requirement.  Second, it forces 
utility companies to invest in renewable systems in order for the state entities to satisfy their  
120 
 
 
requirement.  In many states, energy from renewable systems is charged to customers at a higher 
rate to recoup costs.  This may require that states with this mandate ultimately pay more for their 
energy.  As such, it is important to understand what would influence a state to adopt such a 
policy.  State adoption of green power purchasing policies can be found in Figure 5.2. 
A traditional set of analyses of the adoption of green power purchasing laws can be found 
in Table 5.3.  The DMT identifies the leader-laggard measure as offering the best specified 
model.  The model fit statistics suggest that the model performs well.  However, the analysis 
reveals only one significant relationship – states with more nuclear power plants are more likely 
to adopt green power purchasing.  The interesting part of this result is that none of the state 
policies appear to allow nuclear energy as a qualifying energy source.  Will an expanded analysis 
allow for a better understanding of green power purchasing adoption? 
 
Figure 5.2: State Adoption of Green Power Purchasing Policies, 
1974-2008 
 
Source: Compiled by the author based upon state adoption of its first green power purchasing 
policy 
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Table 5.4 presents the results for the expanded analyses of green power purchasing policy 
adoption.  The DMT indicates that the leader-laggard measure provides the best specified model 
of adoption.  This model is also significantly better specified than the other models.  The model 
fit statistics indicate that the model performs well. 
The data indicates that states that have a more liberal government ideology, have more 
professional legislatures, less wind potential, and more nuclear power plants are more likely to 
adopt.  These results illustrate that an expanded model will certainly help to clarify the 
relationships between the independent variables and the dependent variable.  The addition of the 
feedback influence of existing policies allows the model to identify the true relationship between 
government ideology, legislative professionalism, and wind potential.   
The expanded results also indicate that states were less likely to adopt green power 
purchasing requirements following the national government‟s adoption of the Business Energy 
Tax Credit.  The expanded analysis is also better able to estimate the role of the control for 
leader-laggard diffusion.  With these additional variables, the model is able to identify that leader 
states are more likely to adopt than laggard states. 
The results also allow for a look into the positive and negative feedback roles that 
existing policies can have in shaping future policy adoption.  States that have adopted production 
incentives or production rebates were less likely to adopt.  However, states that had adopted a 
public benefits fund were more likely to adopt green power purchasing regulations. 
As witnessed in previous analyses, the choice of diffusion control will have an influence 
in our ability to understand adoption.  Here, the data indicates that government ideology would 
not be significant if we relied on either EPA measure.  Wind potential and production rebates are 
only significant in the leader-laggard model.  The difference between diffusion measures is  
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greatest for production rebates where there is nearly a one point shift in the z-scores from the 
EPA hybrid model to the leader-laggard model.  Additionally, the leader-laggard model is the 
only model where we do not find renewable portfolio standards to have a significant influence.  
This is also the model where the diffusion control was significant, so it is probable that the 
renewable portfolio standards measures in the other models were inadvertently tapping into the 
idea of leaders and laggards. 
Required Green Power 
A few states have adopted required green power policies.  These policies require that 
utility companies within the state must have a predetermined percentage of their energy come 
from renewable systems.  These are the most direct efforts by states to move toward clean, 
renewable energy.  The penalties for not complying with this requirement varies from state to 
state but generally result in a substantial fine.  If the utility is in the process of installing the 
renewable system, they are usually not penalized, or at least the penalty is reduced.  Utility 
companies are generally not enthusiastic about these policies, even if they were moving in the 
renewable direction on their own.  State adoption of required green power policies is depicted in 
Figure 5.3. 
The traditional analyses of the adoption of required green power policies are presented in 
Table 5.5.  The DMT finds that the EPA measure of diffusion provides the best specified model.  
This measure is also significantly better specified than all of the other measures except the EPA 
hybrid measure, where it is comparatively better specified.  The model fit statistics indicate that 
the model performs well. 
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The results reveal that states with less per capita tax revenue, higher wind potential, and 
less sunshine are more likely to adopt a required green power policy.  These results suggest that 
states may be assuming that the utilities that have to abide by these policies are more likely to 
install wind turbines as opposed to solar to satisfy the requirements.  Additionally, the results 
reveal that as states within an EPA region adopt these policies, non-adopters are less likely to do 
so.  Interestingly, as identified in Chapter 4, when the EPA regional measure of diffusion is 
statistically significant, it has a negative influence on diffusion.  Will this same pattern hold in 
the expanded analyses? 
The expanded analyses of the adoption of required green powers can be found in Table 
5.6.  The DMT reveals that the EPA regional measure still provides the best specified model.  As 
before, this model is significantly better specified than all of the others, expect the EPA hybrid 
model, where it is comparatively better specified.  The model fit statistics indicate that the model 
performs well.    
Figure 5.3: State Adoption of Required Green Power Policies, 
1974-2008 
 
Source: Compiled by the author based upon state adoption of its first required green power policy 
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The analysis indicates that states with less per capita tax revenue, more liberal 
governments, greater wind potential, less sunshine, less electric energy consumption, and more 
public utility commission employees are more likely to adopt required green power policies.  
The expanded model was better able to estimate the relationships and was able to identify 
government ideology, electric energy consumption, and public utility commission employees as 
having an important influence when the traditional model was unable to do so.   
The model finds that states were less likely to adopt this policy after the national 
government adopted its Business Energy Tax Credit.  Again, the data suggests that a state is less 
likely to adopt after other states within their EPA region have adopted their policies.  While none 
of the existing state policies appear to have a statistically significant influence of the likelihood 
of adopting required green power policies, it is clear that their inclusion allowed for a more 
nuanced analysis of the independent variables. 
Unlike many of the previous comparisons between models, there is only one important 
estimation difference between the EPA regional measure and the others.  Both EPA models 
found that states with less sunshine were more likely to adopt than those with more, but none of 
the others found this relationship. 
Public Benefits Funds 
In an effort to raise tax revenue specifically to fund renewable energy financial incentive 
policies, several states have adopted public benefits funds.  These policies are designed to create 
an electrical usage charge that is less noticeable to the public.  These come in two forms.  First, a 
state may directly tax the amount of energy an entity uses, and this tax can be found lined out on 
an energy bill.  The second is a special tax on the utility companies, which results in higher 
utility rates and are ultimately paid by the utility‟s customers.  Either way, this tax creates  
129 
 
revenues that are then used to fund the financial incentives offered by the state.  Figure 5.4 
illustrates the state adoption of public benefits funds over time. 
Traditional analyses of public benefits fund policy adoption can be found in Table 5.7.  
The DMT identifies the leader-laggard measure as providing the best specified model.  This 
model is statistically significantly better specified than any of the others.  The model fit statistics 
indicate that the model performs well. 
The model reveals that states with higher per capita tax revenue and more liberal citizens 
are more likely to adopt public benefits fund policies.  The data also suggests that states that have 
already adopted a renewable portfolio standard are more likely to adopt, as well.  There also 
appears to be a relationship between adoption and being a leader in environmental policies such 
that leaders are more likely to adopt than laggards. 
An expanded set of analyses are presented in Table 5.8.  The DMT indicates that the 
leader-laggard measure of diffusion provides the best specified model of adoption.  This model is  
Figure 5.4: State Adoption of Public Benefits Fund Policies,  
1974-2008 
 
Source: Compiled by the author based upon state adoption of its first public benefits fund policy 
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also statistically significantly better specified than any of the others.  The model fit statistics 
suggest that the model performs well. 
The results indicate that an expanded analysis provides a much better understanding of 
adoption.  The data suggests that states with less professional legislatures and greener conditions 
were more likely to adopt public benefits funds.  This is a substantial difference than what was 
found in the traditional model.  Indeed, the expanded results indicate that neither per capita tax 
revenue nor citizen ideology appears to have a statistically significant influence on adoption 
when the influences of previously adopted policies are included.  Moreover, both legislative 
professionalism and green conditions become statistically significant when these policies are 
included. 
The results indicate that states that have already adopted state-backed grants, state-backed 
loans, and green power purchasing policies were more likely to adopt public benefits funds.  The 
findings also indicate that leader states were more likely to adopt than laggards. 
In addition to the differences between the traditional and expanded analyses, there are 
also several estimation differences between the expanded models.  For instance, both neighbor 
diffusion models found that the citizen and government ideology measures had a statistically 
significant influence.  Legislative professionalism is only significant in the leader-laggard model, 
while tax revenue per capita and electrical energy consumption are only not significant in the 
leader-laggard model.   The green conditions measure is not significant in the neighbor diffusion 
model.   
Differences are found when analyzing the influence of existing policy too.  Corporate tax 
incentive policies are important influences in all but the EPA hybrid and leader-laggard models.  
The results also suggest that state-backed loans are not a significant influence in any of the  
132 
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models except leader-laggard.  Again, these differences suggest that using an incorrect measure 
of diffusion can result in misestimated explanations of policy adoption.   
Net Metering 
Nearly every state has adopted net metering policies.  These policies are designed to 
force utility companies to pay private energy producers the same amount of money that they 
charge per kilowatt-hour of energy as opposed to the fraction of their fee.  If a private entity has 
a renewable system that has a net surplus of energy at any point during the day, the extra energy 
is fed onto the electrical grid.  In theory, this extra power supply ought to be fairly consistent 
over time, and the utility can then schedule when to decrease energy production to take 
advantage of this extra power source.  This is called the deferred cost, which could save the 
utility company a great deal of money and raw materials while still providing sufficient energy 
for their consumers.   
Stoutenborough and Beverlin (2008) first examined the adoption of net metering policies 
through 2004 and found that EPA regional diffusion provided the best specified model and 
explanation for how states learned about this policy.  Recognizing that there may be an 
underlying pattern within both EPA regions and amongst neighbors, Stoutenborough (2009) 
replicated these results while testing the influence of leaders and laggards within regions.  When 
leaders were introduced, Stoutenborough found that the EPA hybrid measure actually provided 
the best specified model of adoption.  However, these analyses offer what can now be considered 
an ill-conceived method of evaluating the influence of existing policy on the adoption.  Their 
formulations aggregated tax incentive policies into one variable and grants and loans into 
another.  As the analyses prior to this illustrate, these existing policies all have differing 
influences on the adoption of any given policy.  Therefore, it is appropriate to re-examine the 
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adoption of this policy using the current methodology.  Will the results be similar to those 
originally found by Stoutenborough and Beverlin (2008) or Stoutenborough (2009)?  Or, have 
things changed in the four additional years analyzed that the influence of the independent 
variables have changed?  State adoption of net metering policies is presented in Figure 5.5. 
The results of the traditional analyses are presented in Table 5.9.  The DMT finds that the 
best specified model is the neighbor hybrid model.  This is significantly better specified than the 
rest of the models.  Obviously, this differs from the findings of both Stoutenborough and 
Beverlin (2008) and Stoutenborough (2009), further illustrating the need to conduct comparison 
analyses between the different types of controls for diffusion.   
The results of the neighbor hybrid model reveal that states with higher per capita tax 
revue, more electric energy consumption, and more public utility commission employees are 
more likely to adopt a net metering policy.  The data also reveal that states that have already 
adopted renewable portfolio standards are more likely to adopt.  Finally, the traditional model  
Figure 5.5: State Adoption of Net Metering Policies,  
1974-2008 
 
Source: Compiled by the author based upon state adoption of its first net metering policy 
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suggests that a non-adopter was more likely to adopt as their neighbors that are leaders in 
environmental policies adopted. 
Expanded analyses of the adoption of net metering policies can be found in Table 5.10.  
These results also indicate the extent to which model choice influences the results.  When 
including the influence of previously adopted policies, the DMT finds that the neighbor hybrid 
measure of diffusion again provides the best specified model.  This model is statistically 
significantly better specified than any of the other four models.  Interestingly, in four separate 
examinations of net metering policy adoption, one found that EPA regional diffusion provides 
the best explanation (Stoutenborough and Beverlin 2008), one found that the EPA hybrid 
measure was best specified (Stoutenborough 2009), while the two presented here find that the 
neighbor hybrid models provide the best specified explanation of adoption.  The model fit 
statistics indicate that the model performs well. 
The results indicate that states with higher per capita tax revenue, fewer nuclear power 
plants, higher levels of electric energy consumption, and a larger number of public utility 
commission employees were more likely to adopt a net metering policy.  Of these, only nuclear 
power plants were not significant in the traditional model, which illustrates the importance of 
fully modeling adoption.  The results indicate that none of the federal policies have a significant 
influence on adoption.   
While their inclusion clarified the influence of the internal determinants and energy 
specific conditions, the existence of other state policies generally did not influence the adoption 
of net metering policies.  Of all of the policies analyzed, the data finds that states that have 
already adopted a production incentive and renewable portfolio standards are more likely to  
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adopt net metering.  Additionally, the results suggest that non-adopters are more likely to adopt 
as their neighbors, particularly the leaders, adopted. 
There were several differences between the coefficient estimates from model to model.  
Two models, EPA hybrid and leader-laggard, found that legislative professionalism influence 
adoption.  The leader-laggard model found that electric energy consumption did not play a 
significant influence.  Additionally, neither neighbor model found the existence of public 
benefits funds to have an important role in the adoption of net metering policies. 
Regulations in Support of Renewable Energy 
Because renewable energy is an inherently complex issue area (Gormley 1986), it is 
inevitable that states will need to adopt policies that are designed to work behind the scenes to 
help support its growth.  At best, these policies operate in the periphery, but they certainly help 
lay the groundwork for a transition to renewable systems.  These regulations also tend to focus 
on the individual or small group that wants to install a renewable system as opposed to corporate, 
high capacity projects.   
Construction & Design  
Over the past couple of decades, states have adopted a number of construction and design 
policies that concern renewable energy systems.  Generally, construction and design policies fall 
into one of two camps.  First, some of these policies concern the retrofitting of a system to an 
existing structure.  These policies are primarily concerned with establishing building codes that 
ensure that the system is safely integrated to an existing building.  For instance, these policies 
will dictate code for installing a solar array to your roof.  The second type of construction and 
design policy concerns new builds.  Building codes are different for new construction and  
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renewable systems.  Generally, these codes ensure that the system was properly integrated to the 
new structure.  These policies typically focus on the installation of solar panels, which should 
suggest the importance of sunshine.  State adoption of construction and design regulations are 
presented in Figure 5.6. 
The traditional sets of analyses are presented in Table 5.11.  The DMT finds that the 
leader-laggard measure creates the best specified model of adoption.  This model is statistically 
significantly better specified than the other models.  The model fit statistics indicate that the 
model performs well.  The results indicate that states with fewer college graduates, more 
sunshine, greater electrical energy consumption, and stronger green conditions are more likely to 
adopt a construction and design policy.  The model also indicates that environmental policy 
leaders are more likely to adopt than laggards. 
 
Figure 5.6: State Adoption of Construction and Design 
Regulations, 1974-2008 
 
Source: Compiled by the author based upon state adoption of its first construction and design 
regulation 
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Table 5.12 presents the expanded analyses of adoption.  The DMT again finds that the 
leader-laggard measure of diffusion provides the best specified model of adoption.  As in the 
traditional model, the leader-laggard model is significantly better specified than the others.  The 
model fit statistics indicate that the model performs well. 
The results suggest that states with less per capita tax revenue, more sunshine, and higher 
electric energy consumption were more likely to adopt construction and design regulations.  The 
expanded model differs from the traditional model in three of its estimates.  The expanded model 
reveals that college graduates and green conditions may not have a significant influence on 
adoption.  On the other hand, the clarifications provided by the expanded model reveals that tax 
revenue may be important.   
The results indicate that states were more likely to adopt construction and design 
regulations after the national government adopted its Business Energy Tax Credit.  The analysis 
also suggests that three previously adopted policies influenced adoption.  Specifically, the 
findings indicate that states that had already adopted a sales tax incentive or green power 
purchasing requirements were more likely to adopt.  However, states that had adopted an excise 
tax incentive were less likely to adopt construction and design regulations.  Finally, the results 
suggest that leader states were more likely to adopt than laggard states. 
Unlike several of the other policies examined, there are only a couple differences 
between the models of construction and design regulation adoption.  The results suggest that the 
combination of the leader-laggard measure and the measures for previous policy adoption were 
able to more accurately measure the influence of green conditions, which is found to be 
statistically significant in the other four models.  Additionally, the two neighbor models found  
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that states that had adopted production rebates were more likely to adopt construction and design 
regulations, but this measure was unable to achieve statistical significance in the other models. 
Access Laws 
In addition to policies concerning construction and design requirements, many states have 
adopted access laws.  These policies are an effort to overcome city, county, and neighborhood 
covenants that may restrict or prohibit the installation of a renewable system.  Usually they 
concern the construction of a solar array, but in some situations they address small wind turbines.  
State adoption of access laws is illustrated in Figure 5.7. 
Table 5.13 presents the analyses of state access law adoption.  The DMT reveals that the 
leader-laggard measure of diffusion provides the model with the best specification.  This model 
is also significantly better specified than the others.  The analysis doesn‟t reveal a great deal of 
insight into what influences the likelihood of adoption.  The model only finds that states with 
more conservative citizens and states that are environmental leaders are more likely to adopt.   
Figure 5.7: State Adoption of Access Laws,  
1974-2008 
 
Source: Compiled by the author based upon state adoption of its first access laws 
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An expanded set of analyses can be found in Table 5.14.  Again, the DMT reveals that 
the leader-laggard measure provides the best specified model, and this model is significantly 
better specified than the others.  The model fit statistics indicate that the model performs well. 
The results of the expanded analysis clearly reveal that this approach allows for better coefficient 
estimations of the independent variables.   
The results indicate that states with more college graduates, more conservative citizens, 
fewer nuclear power plants, more public utility commission employees, and states that were 
leaders in environmental matters were more likely to adopt.  This stands in contrast to the 
traditional model, which only found that citizen ideology had a significant influence.  Indeed, 
while none of the additional variables measuring previous adoption of related policies were 
found to have a significant influence, their inclusion clearly allowed the statistical model to 
better analyze the relationship between the existing variables and the likelihood of adoption.   
While our understanding of access law adoption may not be as complete as we may like, 
it is clear that the choice of the control for diffusion was important.  The leader-laggard model 
was the only model where the results indicate that college graduates, citizen ideology, and 
nuclear power plants play a significant role in the likelihood of adoption.  Likewise, the leader-
laggard model was the only that did not identify sales tax incentive policies as a significant 
influence.   
Interconnection 
While states have established that they have an interest in ensuring that individuals are 
able to install a renewable system, and to do it safely, they also have an interest in guaranteeing 
that these systems are properly integrated with the electrical grid.  If a system is not properly 
connected to the electrical grid, it could potentially cause grid-wide problems, not to mention the  
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risk of electrification or fire.  As a result, almost every state has adopted policies to regulating 
this interconnection.  Figure 5.8 shows the adoption of state interconnection regulations over 
time. 
The analyses of adoption of interconnection policies using a traditional approach are 
presented in Table 5.15.  The DMT suggests that the EPA hybrid measure of diffusion provides 
the best specified model.  This model is significantly better specified than all but the EPA model, 
where it is comparatively better specified.  The model fit statistics indicate that the model 
performs well.   
The results indicate that states with higher per capita tax revenue, lower population 
density, more college graduates, less wind potential, and higher electrical energy consumption 
are more likely to adopt an interconnection policy.  The results also suggest that states that have 
already adopted renewable portfolio standards are more likely to adopt.   
  
Figure 5.8: State Adoption of Corporate Tax Interconnection 
Regulations, 1974-2008 
 
Source: Compiled by the author based upon state adoption of its first interconnection regulation 
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Table 5.16 presents the results of the expanded set of analyses attempting to explain the 
likelihood that a state would adopt an interconnection regulation.  The DMT finds that the EPA 
hybrid measure of diffusion provides the best specified model of adoption.  This model is 
significantly better specified than the others.  The model fit statistics indicate that the model 
performs well. 
The results indicate that states with less population density, more college graduates, more 
conservative governments, less wind potential, and worse green conditions were more likely to 
adopt interconnection regulations.  As seen when comparing most traditional models to their 
expanded models, there are significant estimation differences uncovered.  Tax revenue and 
electric energy consumption are not longer statistically significant.  The differences also find that 
government ideology and green conditions are now significantly influencing the likelihood of 
adoption. 
The data also indicates that none of the federal policies had a significant influence on 
adoption.  However, the existence of previously adopted renewable energy policies seems to play 
an important role in influencing the likelihood of adoption.  Specifically, states that have already 
adopted sales tax incentives and net metering policies are more likely to adopt interconnection 
regulations.  Additionally, states that have adopted state-backed loan programs and excise tax 
incentives are less likely to adopt.  The findings also suggest that renewable portfolio standards 
no longer provide a significant influence on the likelihood of adoption, which indicates that it 
was inaccurately representing the influence of something else. 
In addition to the significant differences between the traditional and expanded model of 
adoption, there are also differences in our estimations based on the measure of diffusion.  The 
models indicate that if we were to only use the leader-laggard measure, we would be unable to   
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identify the significant relationship between government ideology and adoption.  An additional 
difference can be seen in the EPA hybrid model being the only one that doesn‟t identify state-
backed bonds as having a significant impact on the likelihood of adoption. 
Extension Analysis 
To guarantee that the public is safe, states have adopted extension analysis policies.  
These policies require that the electrical lines going to and from the electrical grid meet code 
requirements.  This is particularly important when retrofitting a renewable system to an electrical 
grid that was installed long ago.  Mostly, this is to ensure that electrical fires and electrocutions 
do not occur.  Figure 5.9 depicts state adoption of extension analysis regulations over time.  Thus 
far, only Arizona, Colorado, and Texas have adopted extension analysis regulations.  With only 
three states having adopted this policy, there is not sufficient variation within the dependent 
variable to allow for a proper statistical analysis.  If more states adopt this policy researchers will 
then be able to effectively model policy adoption. 
Figure 5.9: State Adoption of Extension Analysis Regulations, 
1974-2008 
 
Source: Compiled by the author based upon state adoption of its first extension analysis regulation 
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Contractor Licensing 
To protect citizens from unscrupulous renewable energy systems contractors, states have 
begun to adopt licensing programs.  These are designed to try to prevent contractors from 
charging a large fee to install a system, but not doing it properly.  Typically, states require at 
least four years of experience working with renewable systems, usually solar, before they can 
become certified.  Some states even require a year experience in a supervisory role to obtain 
certification.  Figure 5.10 illustrates the adoption of state contractor licensing regulations. 
State adoptions of contractor licensing regulations using the traditional analyses are 
found in Table 5.17.  The DMT suggests that the neighbor measure of diffusion provides the best 
specified model.  Model fit statistics suggest that the model performs well.   The findings 
indicate that states with less wind potential, more sunshine, more electric energy consumption, 
fewer public utility commission employees, and greater green conditions were more likely to  
  
Figure 5.10: State Adoption of Contractor Licensing Regulations, 
1974-2008 
 
Source: Compiled by the author based upon state adoption of its first contractor licensing regulation 
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adopt.  The results also indicate that states that have already adopted renewable portfolio 
standards are more likely to adopt. 
Table 5.18 provides the results of an expanded set of analyses of the adoption of 
contractor licensing regulations.  The DMT reveals that the leader-laggard measure of diffusion 
provides the model that is best specified.  The expanded model approach allows the analysis to 
better measure the impact of the variables, which has led to the neighbor measure no longer 
providing the best specified model.  The model fit statistics indicate that the model performs 
well. 
The results suggest that states with fewer college graduates, less wind potential, more 
sunshine, more electric energy consumption, and fewer public utility commission employees are 
more likely to adopt contractor licensing regulations.  In contrast, these results are similar to 
those found in the traditional model, except for the addition of college graduates and the loss of 
green conditions.    The results also indicate that states that have already adopted a production 
rebate and required green power policies are more likely to adopt.  On the other hand, states that 
have already adopted a personal income tax incentive are less likely to adopt. 
Comparisons between the five expanded models reveal, yet again, that the choice of 
diffusion measure impacts our ability to understand adoption.  College graduates are only found 
to have a significant impact on adoption in the leader-laggard model.  Public utility commission 
employees are only found to not have a significant influence in the EPA model.  Additionally, 
personal tax incentives only have a significant influence in the leader-laggard and neighbor 
hybrid models. 
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Equipment Certification 
Also in an effort to protect the public, four states have adopted equipment certification 
policies.  These are designed to ensure that the renewable system meets the standards set by the 
state.  Mostly, it is to try to prevent charlatans from installing a renewable system, usually solar 
power, which either does not work properly or break because it was constructed with cheap 
products.  Figure 5.11 illustrates state adoption of equipment certification regulations.  
Unfortunately, through 2008, only two states, Arizona and Florida, had adopted this policy, 
which doesn‟t allow for sufficient variation in the dependent variable for estimations.  Since 
2008, Oregon and Minnesota, have adopted their own certification program.  If more states adopt 
this policy researchers will then be able to effectively model policy adoption. 
 
 
Figure 5.11: State Adoption of Equipment Certification 
Regulations, 1974-2008 
 
Source: Compiled by the author based upon state adoption of its first equipment certification 
regulation 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
In this chapter I explored the adoption of state renewable energy rules and regulations.  
Again, I employed a universal modeling approach to allow a comparison between the adoptions 
of state renewable energy incentive policies.  Unfortunately, it was not possible to analyze every 
policy due to too few states having adopted equipment certification and extension analysis 
policies.  However, taken as a whole, these analyses offer several important observations. 
The analyses of each policy reveal that the traditional style of modeling adoption results 
in models that may be underspecified.  All of the expanded models provide a more nuanced 
analysis of adoption by more accurately measuring the feedback of existing state policies and 
national policies on adoption.  In many instances, the expanded models reveal that the traditional 
models have misestimated the relationship between the traditional independent variables and the 
dependent variable.  Estimation inaccuracies should certainly suggest that expanded models 
ought to be emphasized because they offer a more nuanced understanding of adoption and they 
better reflect the inherent complexity of the policy adoption process. 
To illustrate these differences, Table 5.19 presents a summary of the statistically 
significant independent variables that were found in the models that were best specified.  This 
summary reveals that the internal determinants and energy specific conditions were consistently 
misestimated in the traditional models, whereas the expanded models were better able to identify 
how these variables and the dependent variable were related.  A comparison clearly illustrates 
that the expanded models were better able to estimate both positive and negative relationships, 
particularly with government ideology and legislative professionalism. 
The results presented above also provide an interesting view into the dynamics of 
federalism.  Recall, Gormley (1986) would suggest that renewable energy policy is an area that 
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the national government ought to dominate.  However, the states have been heavily involved in 
adopting policies creating financial incentives to encourage the construction of these resources.  
An important issue was to determine if states were motivated by national action.  As Table 5.19 
illustrates, the analyses indicate that the states were acting primarily independent of national 
action.  Only a few policies were influenced by national policy adoption, and this only applied to 
Table 5.19:   Summary of Statistically Significant Independent Variables 
  Traditional  Expanded 
  Positive Negative Total  Positive Negative Total 
Internal Determinants        
 Tax Revenue per Capita 33.3% 11.1% 44.4%  11.1% 33.3% 44.4% 
 Population Density 0% 11.1% 11.1%  0% 11.1% 11.1% 
 College Graduates 22.2% 11.1% 33.3%  22.2% 11.1% 33.3% 
 Government Ideology 0% 0% 0%  22.2% 11.1% 33.3% 
 Citizen Ideology 22.2% 11.1% 33.3%  11.1% 11.1% 22.2% 
 Legislative Professionalism 0% 0% 0%  11.1% 11.1% 22.2% 
         
Energy Specific Conditions        
 Wind Potential 22.2% 22.2% 44.4%  22.2% 33.3% 55.5% 
 Percent Sunshine 22.2% 11.1% 33.3%  33.3% 11.1% 44.4% 
 Nuclear Power Plants 11.1% 0% 11.1%  11.1% 22.2% 33.3% 
 Electric Energy Consumption 55.5% 0% 55.5%  33.3% 11.1% 44.4% 
 PUC Employees 11.1% 22.2% 33.3%  33.3% 22.2% 55.5% 
 Green Conditions 22.2% 0% 22.2%  11.1% 11.1% 22.2% 
         
National Policies        
 Production Incentive - - -  0% 0% 0% 
 Modified Accelerated Cost-
Recovery System 
- - -  0% 0% 0% 
 Business Energy Tax Credit - - -  22.2% 22.2% 44.4% 
 USDA Rural Energy Program - - -  0% 0% 0% 
         
State Incentive Policies        
 Corporate Tax  - - -  0% 0% 0% 
 Personal Tax  - - -  0% 22.2% 22.2% 
 Sales Tax  - - -  33.3% 0% 33.3% 
 Property Tax - - -  11.1% 0% 11.1% 
 Production Incentive - - -  22.2% 11.1% 33.3% 
 Production Rebate - - -  22.2% 11.1% 33.3% 
 Bond - - -  0% 0% 0% 
 Grant - - -  22.2% 0% 22.2% 
 Loan - - -  22.2% 11.1% 33.3% 
 Excise Tax - - -  0% 22.2% 22.2% 
 Industry Support - - -  0% 0% 0% 
         
State Rules & Regulations        
 Renewable Portfolio Standard 44.4% 0% 44.4%  12.5% 0% 12.5% 
 Green Power Purchasing - - -  37.5% 0% 37.5% 
 Required Green Power - - -  25% 0% 25% 
 Public Benefits Fund - - -  12.5% 0% 12.5% 
 Net Metering - - -  25% 0% 25% 
Note: All percentages represent the number of statistically significant results for each variable that identified in the best 
specified model for each of the nine policies, except for the variables representing the policies that were examined in this 
chapter, which were only modeled in eight analyses because they all had to be removed from their own analysis. 
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the adoption of the Business Energy Tax Credit.  Regardless, these results suggest that it would 
be beneficial to control for the influence of the national government on state policy adoption. 
These analyses should also illustrate the importance of controlling for previously adopted 
policies within the policy arena.  The basic idea underlying the feedback loops that are inherent 
to every theory of policymaking is that previously adopted behaviors are going to influence 
future behavior.  However, existing research rarely examines these relationships.  I attempt to 
fully test the influence of pre-existing policies on the adoption of a new policy.  As Table 4.19 
reveals, not every previously adopted policy has a significant influence on the adoption of a 
different policy (i.e. corporate tax incentives, state-backed bonds, and industry support), but the 
cumulative results clearly suggest that existing policies can provide both positive and negative 
feedbacks.  These feedbacks tended to be overwhelmingly positive, which was to be expected.  
However, there were clearly situations where the existence of a specific policy decreased the 
likelihood of adoption.  Certainly these results should encourage policy adoption scholars to 
model the effects of other policies in the policy arena. 
Another goal of these analyses was to determine if our conceptualization of diffusion 
influenced the analyses.  Rarely is it clear prior to analyzing adoption how states learn from one 
another.  It was expected that there were many equally plausible explanations, and that the only 
way to know for certain which best represents policy learning was to model each in a competing 
analysis.  Using a Davidson-MacKinnon test, I was able to fit each model into the others to 
determine which measure of diffusion created the best specified model.  Table 5.20 presents the 
breakdown of best measure of diffusion for each policy and type of model.   
Similar to what was found when examining the incentive policies, policy learning about 
renewable energy rules and regulations follow several paths.  Unlike the incentive policies, the 
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diffusion variable was statistically significant in fourteen of the eighteen models, which indicates 
that diffusion is far more important to understanding the adoption of rules and regulations 
concerning renewable energy.  The examination of state rules and regulations more accurately 
reflects our expectation that diffusion is occurring on most, but not all, state policy adoptions 
(Mooney 2001).  These results also provide additional support that this relationship can be 
negative as well as positive (e.g. Hays and Glick 1997), as two of the fourteen were a negative 
relationship. 
Table 5.20 also reveals another interesting relationship amongst the data.  In both models 
where the EPA regional diffusion variable is statistically significant, the direction of this 
relationship is negative.  This is consistent with what was found when examining state incentive 
policies.  Again, these results indicate that every time the EPA regional diffusion measure was 
identified as the best specified model and had a statistically significant coefficient estimate, that 
estimate was negative.  Is this more than a coincidence? Given data limitations this is simply an 
open question that awaits future analysis. 
When conceptualizing diffusion in several different manners, it is expected that not all of 
the policies will spread in the same manner.  It is possible that certain policies are more likely to 
follow a leader-laggard approach, while others may be spread through the assistance of the EPA.  
Table 5.20:  Summary of Diffusion Measures and Model Specification 
 Traditional Models  Expanded Models 
 Best 
Modela 
DMT 
Significantb 
Estimate 
Significantc 
Estimate 
Negatived 
 Best 
Modela 
DMT 
Significantb 
Estimate 
Significantc 
Estimate 
Negatived 
EPA 1 .75 1 1  1 .75 1 1 
EPA Hybrid 1 .75 1 0  1 1 0 n/a 
Neighbor 2 1 1 0  1 1 1 0 
Neighbor Hybrid 1 1 1 0  1 1 1 0 
Leader-Laggard 4 3 3 0  5 4 4 0 
Notes: 
a: The number of times each measure of diffusion was identified as the measure that provided the best specified model 
b: The number of times the Davidson-MacKinnon Test identified the measure as being statistically significantly better that the other measures.  If a 
measure was not significantly better than all four measures, a decimal was added to represent the percent of that it was significantly better. 
c: The number of times the best specified measure resulted in a statistically significant coefficient estimate.   
d: The number of times a significant result was negative. 
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Despite all of the policies examined in this chapter generally falling under the category of rules 
and regulations, the method of learning within the states varied greatly.  As Table 5.20 
illustrates, clearly diffusion is not consistent within a policy arena.  This suggests that policy 
scholars should not rely solely on the results of previous policy research in a policy arena to 
determine what type of diffusion should be modeled.  Indeed, the analysis of net metering 
policies confirms the need to reexamine the possibility that a different measure of diffusion may 
provide a better understanding of policy adoption than one that was previously identified as 
important.  Moreover, of the eight policies examined, the measure of diffusion that presented the 
best specified model changed once, suggesting that better models can alter estimations.  
Together, these results suggest that this approach to identifying the best measure ought to be 
used by policy scholars. 
Finally, while it was not always the case, several models revealed that one form of 
measuring diffusion created models that were statistically significantly better specified than the 
others.  When this occurred, there can be no doubt that that particular measure was the best.  In 
twelve of the eighteen models, the DMT reveals that one measure of diffusion created a model 
that was significantly better specified than the four others.  Three measures were significantly 
better than three of the four alternatives, with the exception being the hybrid or regular version of 
the measure.  This is important to note because more than eighty percent of the eighteen models 
resulted in a measure that created a model that significantly better specified than the others.  If 
any of the other options were used, it would have resulted in inaccurate estimations.   
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Policy Evaluation 
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Promoting Wind Energy:   
Evaluating the Effects of State Renewable Energy Incentives 
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Policy scholarship has grown increasingly sophisticated in the last three decades.  As 
policy studies moved from the general approaches of Lasswell (1956) and Cohen, March and 
Olson (1972) to the more sophisticated theories of Mazmanian and Sabatier (1981, 1983), 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993), and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1988) our understanding of the 
policy process has made giant strides.  However, in our quest to create more sophisticated 
theories, we began to limit the focus of our studies primarily to the adoption process, and to a 
lesser extent the implementation process. 
Understanding if the policies we analyze succeed ought to be an important aspect of 
policy research.  Indeed, Meier (1994, xlv) argues that “policy implementation and policy 
outcomes are integral parts of the policymaking process and must be studied to obtain an 
accurate view of a policy.”  He goes on to say, “Only by determining the impact that public 
policies have on the public can we get an accurate portrayal of the politics of public policy” 
(Meier 1994, xlv). 
The study of policy impacts is particularly important seeing as the literature seems to 
suggest that there are a lot of opportunities for a policy to fail.  Edelman (1964) was perhaps the 
biggest proponent that some policies are not intended to have a material impact because they 
were meant to be symbolic.  An examination of the implementation literature reveals several 
reasons that a policy could fail to achieve its goals.  For instance, Mazmanian and Sabatier‟s 
(1981; 1983) top-down approach clearly identifies pitfalls that could cause a policy to fail.  
Furthermore, the literature finds that policies that provide a financial incentive to achieve a 
policy goal often fail, principally in environmental areas (e.g. Caldwell 1970; Sagoff 1988).  In a 
time of budget crunching and economic hardship, state legislatures and the federal government 
should be increasingly interested in the outcome of policy analyses.     
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As the federal and state governments continue to allocate billions of dollars in renewable 
energy incentives, it is imperative to evaluate whether these policies achieve their goals.  With 
all of the potential pitfalls that could prevent a policy from achieving its goal(s), and the failures 
of previous environmental incentive policies (e.g. Sagoff 1988), have renewable energy incentive 
policies provided an incentive for developers to build renewable energy systems?   
To answer this question, I evaluate the influence of state and federal renewable energy 
incentives on the installed wind energy capacity in each state.  I will proceed in three parts.  
First, I discuss renewable energy policy and pertinent policy literature.  Second, I analyze the 
impact of state financial incentives and rules and regulations of renewable energy on the 
construction of wind turbines.  Finally, there will be a discussion of the implications of this 
project.  The results of this examination will identify several renewable energy policies that 
appear to achieve their goals, and other policies that actually have a negative impact. 
Renewable Energy and Policy Analysis 
Since the 1970s, public concern about the environment has grown significantly (Kraft 
and Vig 2005).  Previous scholarly attempts to examine the effectiveness of environmental 
policies have resulted in mixed findings.  Scholars have found that these policies do not always 
meet expectations (e.g. Downing and Kimball 1982; Freeman and Havemen 1972).  Moreover, 
personnel and budgetary shortages, technical and scientific obstacles and uncertainties, and the 
need for consultation with various levels of government complicate implementation (e.g. Landy, 
Roberts and Thomas 1994; Marcus 1980). 
There are three potential reasons that a renewable energy policy could fail to achieve its 
goals.  First, there could be a problem with the implementation process.  Mazmanian and 
Sabatier (1981; 1983) identify several policy mechanisms that must be in place for a policy to be 
174 
 
properly implemented.  They suggest that material variables (e.g. technical difficulties, target 
group behavior, amount of behavior change required), structural variables (i.e. clear and 
consistent objectives, incorporation of adequate causal theory, hierarchical integration within and 
among implanting institutions, decisions rules of implementing agencies, recruitment of 
implementing officials, initial allocation of financial resources, and formal access by outsiders), 
and contextual variables (e.g. public support, socioeconomic variables, support from legislators, 
and commitment from implementing official) are important conditions that need to be 
established (Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983).  They argue that a problem at any of these different 
points could potentially derail the implementation of a policy.  If a policy is not correctly 
implemented, it may not be able to achieve its policy goals.   
Second, it is possible that a policy may be a symbolic attempt to appease certain 
segments of the populace (Edelman 1964).  When this occurs, there is a distinct possibility that a 
policy will end up not having a material impact.  Often, there is a problem at the implementation 
process because interested groups no longer pay attention (Edelman 1964).  However, this is not 
always the case.  Sometimes, a policy was never intended to have a material impact because they 
are limited to a small proportion of the population.  This could be the case for several renewable 
energy policies.  For instance, personal tax incentives are unlikely to have a large impact on the 
construction of renewable energy systems simply because those renewable systems are often too 
expensive for the typical individual to make the investment, even with the incentive.  These 
policies tend to make specific interests happy, but could ultimately have little impact. 
Finally, some scholars would go as far as to say that any attempt to address 
environmental problems through economic incentives is doomed to failure (i.e. Caldwell 1970; 
Dryzek 1987; Heilbroner 1974; Ophuls 1977; Sagoff 1988).  This isn‟t to say that environmental 
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policy has all been a failure.  Certainly, many environmental policies have achieved their goals 
(e.g. Magat and Viscusi 1990; White 1982).  However, most environmental policies are 
associated with regulatory changes, and not with financial incentives.  The literature indicates 
that it is these incentives that typically fail (e.g. Sagoff 1988).  This line of literature is 
particularly important since renewable energy is often thought of as an environmental issue, and 
the national and state governments provide a number of financial incentives to encourage the 
construction of renewable systems.   
An examination of renewable energy policy allows for a unique opportunity to analyze 
public policy.  As Figure 6.1 illustrates, there has been a great deal of wind energy installed since 
2000.  Have state and national renewable energy policies helped to encourage this growth?  With 
Figure 6.1:  Cumulative and Annual Wind Energy Installations in the United States, 
2000-2010 
 
Source: AWEA (2010) 
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such a large number of competing incentive policies, all of which are intended to increase the 
likelihood of using renewable energy systems, it is important to evaluate which policies appear 
to provide a material benefit.   
Renewable Energy Policies 
The states and national government have adopted several policies that are designed to 
provide financial incentives for developers to build renewable energy systems.  However, states 
have been more aggressive in their attempts to promote renewable energy.  Indeed, several states 
adopted incentive policies in the late 1970s, while the national government created its first 
incentive in 1986.  Despite several states offering incentives in the early 1980s, the majority of 
the renewable energy incentive policies have been adopted since 2000. 
The national government has been a bit slower to create renewable energy incentive 
policies.  In 1986, they adopted the Modified Accelerated Cost-Recovery System, which 
modifies the way depreciation is calculated for renewable energy systems (26 USC § 168).  In 
1992, the national government adopted its Renewable Electricity Production Tax Credit.  The 
production tax credit creates a per-kilowatt-hour tax credit for electricity generated and sold.  For 
wind energy, the developer of a wind farm can deduct 2.2¢ / kWh for up to ten years after a 
phase has been placed in service (26 USC § 45).  In 2002, the national government adopted the 
USDA Rural Energy for America Program, which provides loan and grant guarantees for the 
construction of renewable energy systems (7 USC § 8106).  Finally, in 2006, they adopted the 
Business Energy Investment Tax Credit.  This tax credit allows for a deduction of up to thirty 
percent of expenditures (26 USC § 48). 
State governments have enacted a wide range of incentive policies in an attempt to 
encourage renewable energy.  As depicted in Tables 2.1 and 2.2, states have adopted several 
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hundred financial incentive policies and rules and regulations. While not all of these apply to 
wind energy, it is clear that states have been very active in promoting renewable energy 
development within their borders. 
Generally, state tax incentives are treated as deductions on state income taxes.  State sales 
tax incentives allow an individual/developer to deduct any sales tax paid for renewable energy, 
so long as the sales tax was paid within the state.  This deduction can be a bit deceiving since 
most sales tax is not paid in the state where the renewable energy system is installed because 
most require purchases directly from the manufacturer.  For wind energy, this limits the 
applicability of these policies since wind turbines are built in only a few states.  Property tax 
incentives vary, while some tend to only apply to the plot of land that the renewable energy 
system actually occupies, others apply to the value of the system.  An excise tax is a tax on 
goods produced within the state.  They are usually associated with the production of goods that 
can somehow hurt people whether physically (e.g. tobacco, alcohol, etc.) or indirectly through 
pollution during the production process (e.g. coal or oil-based electricity, steel, etc.).  Some 
states have provisions in their excise tax regulations that apply to all electricity producers, which 
have caused two states to create tax credits for renewable energy systems since they don‟t fall 
into the same category as traditional, pollution creating energy sources. 
State production incentives are very similar to the national governments production tax 
credit, in that they allow those that produce renewable energy to deduct a set amount of money 
for each kilowatt-hour of energy created.  Production rebates, on the other hand, provide a one-
time, lump-sum rebate once a renewable energy source is producing energy.  Recognizing that 
supply needed to be increased to meet the demand for renewable systems, many states have 
adopted industry support policies that help to ease the burden associated with starting a new 
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manufacturing plant that builds these renewable systems.  States also provide grants, loans and 
bonds in an effort to help fund the construction of renewable energy systems. 
However, these only tell a part of the renewable energy story.  It is important to also 
focus on the influence of peripheral policies on an outcome.  Within renewable energy policy 
there is a large group of policies that are generally described as rules and regulations.  While 
typically ignored in many analyses, rules and regulations often lay the groundwork for achieving 
a stated policy goal. 
For an inherently complex issue (Gormley 1986), there ought to be a number of rules or 
regulations that might be needed to encourage the construction of wind turbines.  Indeed, through 
2009, states have adopted several hundred of these types of policies.  Again, not all of these 
policies include wind energy as a qualifying technology, but it does demonstrate the need for 
these policies. 
Renewable portfolio standards are often considered to be the most important policies to 
promote the construction of renewable energy systems (Wiser, Porter and Grace 2005) because 
they mandate that a predetermined percentage of the electricity consumed within a state must be 
generated by renewable systems, and they are typically politically safe policies to support (Rabe 
2007).  However, renewable portfolio standards typically do not specify how these goals are to 
be obtained, or what would happen in the event the stated goals are not met.  Green power 
purchasing policies require that state agencies purchase a certain percentage of their electricity 
from renewable systems.  States that have adopted required green power laws mandate that 
utility companies provide electricity produced by renewable systems.  To help utilities transition 
to renewable systems several states have adopted public benefits funds, which result in utilities 
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charging a special fee to their customers.  This revenue is then used to provide several of the 
financial incentives previously discussed. 
Many states have also created construction and design policies.  Some of these require 
the “greening” of existing state buildings, while others create new building codes pertaining to 
the retrofitting of renewable systems to an existing structure or adding them to a new structure.  
Access laws were typically created to benefit the construction of solar arrays and overturn 
existing county, city, and neighborhood covenant policies that may otherwise prevent the 
construction of a renewable energy system.  Interconnection laws concern the technology and 
regulations that actually connect a renewable source to the electrical grid.   
States have also adopted rules and regulations that have been designed to protect the 
interests of the public.  Net metering policies require that utility companies pay the same rate 
they charge for extra renewable energy that is put onto the electric grid, often referred to as the 
deferred costs.  A few states require contractors to be licensed in an effort to ensure that 
renewable systems are installed by reputable and qualified experts.  Finally, equipment 
certification policies are designed to guarantee that the renewable systems installed meet the 
state‟s safety and quality criteria. 
Each of these rules and regulations are intended to have a positive impact on the 
construction of renewable energy.  While financial incentives tend to generate the most attention, 
many of these rules and regulations ought to also have a significant impact on construction.  To 
what extent do these policies provide the groundwork to encourage construction?  To truly 
understand impact of renewable energy policies it is essential that these peripheral policies are 
also modeled along with financial incentives. 
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Strategy of Analysis 
With all of the possible road blocks in their way, have renewable energy policies 
achieved their intended goals of providing an incentive for the construction of renewable energy 
systems?  There are two possible ways to examine installed wind energy capacity, which is 
measured in megawatt-hours.  First, one could examine the total installed wind power capacity in 
each state.  This approach would result in a dependent variable that would be a cumulative count 
of capacity in each year, which would model the long-term influence of a policy on capacity.  
Second, one could examine the total yearly change in wind capacity for each state.
27
  Here, the 
dependent variable would only measure change.  This approach would allow for an examination 
of short-term influence on capacity.  Each of these approaches has their advantages and 
disadvantages for explaining the influence of incentive policies.  However, taken together, they 
would allow for generalizations to be drawn as to the relative effectiveness of each policy.  
Accordingly, this project will model both measures to provide a more complete analysis. 
To determine the influence of renewable energy policies on the construction of wind 
turbines, data was collected for each state for each year between 1984 and 2008.
28
  Both 
dependent variables are count data, which suggests that either a poisson distribution or a negative 
binomial distribution would be the best statistical approaches to use in this examination.  
Because there was overdispersion in both of these measures, a negative binomial cross-sectional 
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 The yearly change in installed wind capacity model is for each state between 1985 and 2008.  The year 1984 was 
dropped from this particular analysis because there was no way to determine how much wind energy was added in 
California during 1984. 
28
 At present time, data is unavailable for installed wind capacity prior to 1984.  This limitation only applies to 
California, who held capacity fairly stable between 1980 and 1985.   
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time-series model is used to estimate the influence of policies on the construction of wind 
energy.
29
 
Traditionally, policy analyses examine the influence of one policy on whatever 
phenomenon a policy was designed to impact.  This presumes that the influence of public 
policies operate within a vacuum, and doesn‟t represent the reality that there might be several 
policies that concurrently work together to achieve a policy goal.  This project seeks to 
understand the simultaneous impact of all of the incentive policies and rules and regulations on 
the construction of wind turbines.  It is possible the many of the problems that previous incentive 
policy examinations (e.g. Sagoff 1988) experienced was due to underspecified statistical 
modeling and this approach ought to best allow for a proper examination of the influence of a 
policy. 
Information on state and federal policies was collected.  The data was coded as a 
cumulative count of the number of policies adopted in a particular policy type (i.e. corporate tax 
                                                 
29
 A random-effects overdispersion model is used.  Therefore, it is assumed that 1/(1 + δ) ~ Beta(r,s), which allows 
δ, the dispersion parameter, to vary randomly across groups.  The joint probability of the counts for the ith group is  
 
 
for Xi = (xi1,…,xini).  Where yit is the count for the tth observation in the ith group, and λit = exp(xitβ + offsetit).  The 
log likelihood is  
 
 
where wi  is the weight for the ith group. 
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incentives, state-backed loans, production incentives, etc.).
30
  A number of states have adopted 
multiple, similar incentive policies.  For instance, in 2001 California adopted its second 
production rebate, and in 2005 Connecticut adopted its fourth state-backed grant.  This process 
was used to determine the availability of incentives for every state in each policy incentive.
31
 
I expect that when compared to corporate incentives, personal level incentives will be 
less likely to provide a significant influence on installed wind energy.  For instance, a personal 
tax credit is likely to be used to build a relatively small wind turbine, as opposed to a corporate 
tax incentive that is used to build an entire wind farm.  As such, for personal level incentives to 
have a significant influence on capacity, it would require a massive investment in small turbines 
every year, whereas one modestly sized wind farm could result in a substantial increase in 
capacity.  Therefore, I expect that personal tax incentives and sales tax incentives are less likely 
to provide a large impact on wind energy. 
Because there are many things that can slow the impact of a policy, it is important to lag 
the influence of each policy.  Indeed, few policies become instantly available.  This is 
particularly the case for state and federal incentives which usually require an administrative arm 
of the bureaucracy to oversee applications.  The implementation of a policy alone suggests that it 
would take at least one year for a policy to have an impact on wind capacity.  As such, it is 
unreasonable to expect that a production incentive adopted in 2000 would have an impact on the 
installed wind capacity of 2000, particularly if the incentive couldn‟t be accessed until 2001.   
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 An attempt was made to code based on the amount each incentive offers.  However, several policies do not 
stipulate maximum values.  Instead, these policies allow for a predetermined percentage of costs to be the limit.  
Additionally, several of these policies do not appear to contain limits for the total amount of money that can be 
allocated/deducted in a given year, making it impossible to know how to code these policies.  As a result, a simple 
count is the best option available at this time. 
31
 Policies that did not include wind energy as an eligible renewable system were not included in this analysis. 
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Unfortunately, there are several other factors that can slow the impact of a policy.  
Construction time tables, access to experienced crews, and the availability of wind turbines can 
also slow the process, thus further pushing the measureable impact of a policy back.  Recently, 
demand for large wind turbines have resulted in back orders that prevent a phase from going 
online for two years (e.g. Kanellos 2008; Redell 2008).
32
  This means that if a policy provides 
sufficient incentive for a developer to build a wind farm, it could take two years before the 
additional capacity would be installed, and counted toward the total. 
This suggests that each policy needs to be lagged two years before it is reasonable for that 
policy to produce any additional capacity.  Accordingly, each policy is lagged two years.  For 
instance, Kansas adopted a property tax incentive in 2001.  Under the two-year lag, it would be 
coded as a policy from 2003 to 2008.  This process was applied to every policy adopted, which 
meant that any policy adopted in 2007 or 2008 were unable to be modeled. 
It is also important to consider several state characteristics because states are expected to 
be in the best position to respond to local concerns and conditions (Pressman and Wildavsky 
1984).  I consider the influence of state wind potential, the number of nuclear power plants, 
electric energy consumption, the number of public utility commission employees, population 
density, legislative professionalism (Squire 2007) the percent of the state that are college 
graduates, government and citizen ideology (Berry et al. 1998), the state green policy score (Hall 
and Kerr 1991), and state green conditions (Hall and Kerr 1991).   
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 Since 2007, the demand for large wind turbines has created sufficient incentives for the construction of additional 
manufacturing plants across the country.  Indeed, when the national government adopted the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act of 2009, they included the Qualified Advanced Energy Manufacturing Investment Tax Credit 
which would allow the Department of Energy and the Department of Treasury to fund up to thirty percent of a 
qualified manufacturing plants initial capital investment.  Additionally, many states have begun to offer industry 
support programs to try to lure manufacturing to their states.  An increase in manufacturing should reduce the 
amount of time between ordering a turbine and the delivery of that turbine. 
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It is anticipated that states with greater wind potential would be more likely to install 
wind energy.
33
  I model the number of nuclear power plants because nuclear power was the 
original clean power (Ramey 1973).  Moreover, nuclear power plants are typically nowhere near 
production capacity, which suggests that demand for new sources of electrical energy may not be 
particularly high.  Accordingly, I expect that states with more nuclear power plants would be less 
likely to install wind power.  Meanwhile, to help meet demand, states that consume more electric 
energy ought to be more likely to install wind power.  I expect that states with larger numbers of 
public utility commission employees will be more able to facilitate the coordination between 
governmental entities and those investing in wind turbines.  Likewise, states with more 
professional legislatures ought to be betters suited to oversee the bureaucracy, which should 
make it easier for them to ensure that the agencies are properly implementing policies. 
Because wind farms currently require large, undeveloped, plots of land, I anticipate that 
states with lower levels of population density would be more likely to develop wind energy.  
Generally speaking, I expect that those with more education are better able to process 
information.  Furthermore, those with more education are generally more predisposed to be 
environmentalists (e.g. Buttel and Flinn 1974).  Accordingly, I anticipate that states with a higher 
percentage of college graduates are more likely to install wind power.  Likewise, liberals are 
generally more predisposed to be environmentalists (e.g. Ellis and Thompson 1997).  As such, 
states with more liberal citizens ought to be more likely to install wind turbines.  Similarly, state 
legislatures that are more liberal should be more accommodating to developers of wind farms.  
States that generally adopt more environmentally green policies ought to be more likely to see an 
investment in wind turbines because these states should already have strong base of support for 
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 Wind potential is determined by a variety of characteristics, but is primarily a reflection of the consistent speed of 
wind across large swaths of land.   
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these systems.  Finally, the environmental conditions within states vary greatly depending upon a 
whole host of factors such as water and air pollution, community health, agriculture pollution, 
toxic waste, and even life quality, which includes indicators like recreational waters, visitors to 
state parks, and conservation members (see Hall and Kerr 1991).  I anticipate that states that 
generally have greener conditions will be more likely to install wind energy. 
Finally, a trend variable was added to ensure that duration dependence was not a factor.  
In particular, this should a problem with the cumulative wind capacity model because there has 
never been an instance of a decrease in installed capacity.  Accordingly, the dependent variable 
is either always increasing or staying constant.  To take this into consideration, a trend variable 
similar to those created in the policy adoption chapters was created for both dependent variables.  
For the total installed capacity model, the trend variable was created by taking the square root of 
the number of years before 2008, which is the year when the most cumulative wind energy 
capacity existed.  For the yearly change in capacity model, I used a trend with a base year of 
2007 because that represented the year when the most wind capacity was added.  This trend was 
created by taking the square root of the number of years before and after 2007.   
Estimation Concerns 
As found when estimating models for Chapters 4 and 5, there was an estimation concern 
that necessitated the removal of two variables from the statistical model.  The statistical software 
was unable to fit the comparison model because the log-likelihood was “not concave.”  This 
meant that the software was unable to even begin to estimate coefficients, even after several 
thousand iterations.  To overcome this problem, variables were added one at a time to the 
analysis.  If a variable caused the log-likelihood to become “not concave,” previously added 
variables would be removed to determine if the problem variable was the new variable, or a 
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combination of variables.  In every circumstance where this occurred, the variable that was 
added when the problem occurred was the culprit, and it was removed from the analysis.  For 
reasons that are unknown, the state-backed bonds and equipment certification variables resulted 
in the log-likelihood problem in every model they were included, which is why they will not be 
found in any of the models.
34
 
Results 
The results indicate that this analytical approach provides a good understanding of how 
states and the national government can influence the construction of wind turbines.  The results 
of the negative binomial cross-sectional time-series are presented below.  The model fit statistics 
indicate that both models perform well.  To simplify the discussion of the statistical findings, the 
total wind capacity model will be presented first. 
Analysis of Total Wind Capacity 
The results of the total wind capacity model suggest that there are number of ways that 
states and the national government influences the construction of wind turbines.  Table 6.1 
provides the results of the statistical analysis.  The estimate for the trend variable indicates that it 
was important to control for duration dependence.   
Beginning with the influence of state characteristics, the results reveal that states with 
more nuclear power plants, energy consumption, fewer public utility commission employees, 
more conservative government ideology, greater green conditions, and more professional 
legislatures are more likely to install wind turbines.  The most striking of these results is that the 
state‟s wind potential ranking does not appear to have a significant influence on the construction 
of wind turbines.  It is likely that this is being influenced by the lack of development in Kansas,  
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 Both of these policies have only been adopted by two states, which may account for the problem. 
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North and South Dakota, Montana and Nebraska, which are five of the top six states in potential.  
Additionally, states like Oregon and Washington, who are twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth 
Table 6.1: Impact of State and National Incentive Policies and State Rules and 
Regulations on Installed Wind Energy Capacity 
  Total Installed Capacity  Yearly Change in Capacity 
  Coefficient Probability  Coefficient Probability 
State Incentive Policies      
 Corporate Tax 1.324 (.462) .004  -.101 (.568) .859 
 Personal Tax -1.146 (.393) .004  .047 (.260) .917 
 Sales Tax .035 (.248) .885  -.507 (.370) .171 
 Property Tax .459 (.061) .000  -.135 (.160) .398 
 Production Incentives -.407 (.339) .230  .118 (.429) .782 
 Production Rebates -.818 (.197) .000  -.794 (.336) .018 
 Grants -.225 (.134) .094  .130 (.269) .629 
 Loans .740 (.138) .000  .356 (.171) .038 
 Excise Tax -.446 (.631) .479  .434 (.721) .547 
 Industry Support .240 (.178) .177  -.222 (.245) .365 
       
State Rules & Regulations      
 Renewable Portfolio Standard -.692 (.156) .000  -.084 (.261) .746 
 Green Power Purchasing .390 (.248) .116  -.334 (.525) .524 
 Required Green Power .942 (.371) .011  .723 (.384) .060 
 Public Benefits Fund .022 (.224) .919  -.015 (.326) .963 
 Construction & Design -.411 (.162) .012  -.123 (.331) .711 
 Access Laws -.524 (.304) .084  -.312 (.288) .278 
 Interconnection .369 (.206) .074  .444 (.293) .130 
 Net Metering .713 (.126) .000  .470 (.260) .071 
 Contractor Licensing 1.877 (.446) .000  -.579 (.656) .378 
       
National Policies      
 Production Tax Credit .993 (.338) .003  1.130 (.586) .054 
 Modified Accelerated  
  Cost-Recovery System 
-.730 (.475) .124  -.643 (.872) .461 
 Business Energy Tax Credit -.270 (.158) .088  -.141 (.281) .616 
 USDA Rural Energy Grant .249 (.151) .098  -.237 (.299) .426 
       
State Characteristics      
 State Wind Potential -.003 (.012) .764  .087 (.013) .000 
 Nuclear Power Plants .091 (.054) .093  -.079 (.075) .291 
 Energy Consumption .007 (.002) .008  .007 (.003) .048 
 PUC Employees -.002 (.0003) .000  -.00007 (.0004) .872 
 Population Density .0001 (.0007) .805  -.001 (.0009) .077 
 College Graduates .022 (.015) .134  .018 (.020) .357 
 Government Ideology -.010 (.005) .048  -.003 (.006) .624 
 Citizen Ideology .006 (.008) .437  .013 (.009) .177 
 Green Policy -.0003 (.0002) .113  .001 (.0002) .000 
 Green Conditions .001 (.0002) .000  .0001 (.0003) .583 
 Legislative Professionalism 5.416 (1.030) .000  .509 (1.252) .684 
       
Trend -1.108 (.100) .000  -.968 (.186) .000 
Constant -2.729 (.856) .001  -6.928 (1.375) .000 
       
Number of Cases 1250   1200  
Log Likelihood -1924.565   -1186.445  
Wald Chi2 2567.76 .0000  462.81 .0000 
Standard errors in parentheses.  Two-Tailed Tests. 
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respectively, have a combined total of installed wind capacity greater than the combined total of 
those five top-ranked states. 
Looking at national policies, it is not surprising to find that wind turbines were more 
likely to be installed after the passage of the federal Production Tax Credit, which interest groups 
have long advocated was an essential incentive policy (e.g. Krauss 2007).  The results also 
suggest that wind turbines are more likely to be installed after the adoption of the USDA Rural 
Energy Grant, but less likely following the Business Energy Tax Credit. 
The results also indicate that state policies can have an important influence on the 
construction of wind turbines.  Specifically, the findings suggest that states that have adopted 
corporate tax incentives, property tax incentives, state-backed loans, required green power, 
interconnection regulations, net metering, and contract licensing rules were more likely to install 
wind turbines.  Additionally, I find that states with personal tax incentives, production rebates, 
state-backed grants, renewable portfolio standards, construction and design regulations, and 
access laws were less likely to install capacity.  Perhaps the most unexpected of these results is 
that the renewable portfolio standards appear to have a negative relationship with wind energy.  
Everything would suggest that a policy that sets goals for renewable energy production would 
have a positive impact on capacity (Wiser, Porter and Grace 2005).  Perhaps this is a reflection 
of the relatively recent nature of these adoptions, and a little more time would reveal the 
anticipated relationship.  The results also indicate that public benefits funds do not have a 
significant influence on capacity, which is unexpected since these policies are used to raise the 
money used to fund other financial incentives.   
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Analysis of Yearly Change in Capacity 
The analysis of yearly change reveal several important influences on capacity, and 
suggest that it is important to consider analyzing policy impacts in several manners.  These 
results can also be found in Table 6.1.  Again, the analysis indicates that duration dependence 
was a concern, and that a trend variable was needed. 
The findings suggest that only the federal Production Tax Credit has a significant 
influence on yearly change in wind capacity.  This suggests that both the Business Energy Tax 
Credit and USDA Rural Energy Grant may have a cumulative impact, but not a short term 
influence.   
The analysis also identifies several state characteristics that have an important influence 
on wind capacity.  Specifically, states with greater wind potential, greater energy consumption, 
less population density, and more green policies are more likely to install wind capacity.  While 
wind potential doesn‟t appear to have a cumulative influence, it certainly has a short term impact 
that is consistent with what was anticipated. 
State policies also play an important short term influence on wind turbine construction.  
The results indicate that states with state-backed loans, required green power, and net metering 
are more likely to have higher levels of capacity.  However, state production rebates still have a 
negative impact on capacity.  Again, there is no support for the argument that renewable 
portfolio standards have a significant influence on capacity.  The same is true for public benefits 
funds. 
Discussion 
The results of these models reveal several important findings.  It is clear that it is 
important to examine the impact of policies in more than one way, if it is an option.  While one 
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set of models examined the cumulative effect of policies on installed wind capacity, the other set 
explored the influence of the same policies on yearly change.  At face value, one may not think 
that there would be much of a difference between these models.  However, the data indicates that 
both approaches are of merit.   
The two-model approach allows for a more complete analysis of the impact of policies.   
If this project had only examined the impact of the policies on one of these two measures, the 
results would have been incomplete, as would our understanding of how these policies actually 
influence wind energy construction.  Depending upon the dependent variable explored, the 
results could have overlooked the positive impact of corporate tax incentives or state wind 
potential.  Likewise, and potentially more important for policymakers, the results could have 
been unaware of the negative impact of state-backed grants.  Moreover, this analytical approach 
reveals that some policies may not have measureable short-term impact, but may actually reveal 
their importance over time. 
Interestingly, the results provide mixed support for the use of financial incentive policies.  
Incongruent with the findings of Sagoff (1988), Caldwell (1970), and others, the results of the 
analyses generally find support for some of the incentive-based approaches used by many states.   
It is possible that these models benefit from the inclusion of all of the policies concerning 
renewable energy, as opposed to one or two policies.  It is also probable that the analytical 
approach using the cross-sectional negative binomial time-series allowed for more precise 
coefficient estimates.   
Regardless, the data indicate that the positive influence of incentive policies and rules and 
regulations tend to have more of a cumulative effect than a short-term impact.  On the other 
hand, the results reveal that three incentive policies are consistent with previous research.  
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Indeed, state personal tax incentives, production rebates, and state-backed grants have a negative 
impact in the cumulative analysis, while production rebates also has a negative impact in the 
yearly analysis.  The results also indicate that three of the rules and regulations also had a 
negative impact - renewable portfolio standards, construction and design regulations, and access 
laws.  It was anticipated that personal tax incentives were more likely to be symbolic in nature, 
so it may not necessarily be that these policies failed to achieve their goals.  Nevertheless, the 
rest of these policies had unanticipated results, and appear to fall under the category of policies 
that fail to achieve their goals. 
By combining the influence of national policies and state policies, this paper also reveals 
that states can play an important role towards achieving a particular goal even when the national 
government is actively involved.  Importantly, this suggests that states and the national 
government can work together to achieve these goals.  Often, the national government dominates 
a policy arena when it decides to get involved, while the states play a cursory role.  This is 
particularly true when the issue area is highly complex and salient (Gormley 1986), as with 
renewable energy.  Here, the results clearly suggest that states play an important role in 
encouraging the development of wind power in their state, while the influence of the national 
government is also prominent.  Indeed, these results find support for Pressman and Wildavsky‟s 
(1984) assertion that states are in the best position to adopt policies that impact their 
environment.   
Conclusion 
Traditionally, policy scholars tend to focus their examinations on the adoption phase of 
the policy process.  Accordingly, scholars fail to take their examinations to the next level to 
determine if the policies that are studied actually achieve their goal.  With this in mind, I build on 
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the results of Chapters 4 and 5 by conducting a comparative exploration of the impact of state 
and national policies on installed wind energy capacity. 
This project deviates from previous attempts to measure policy impacts in two ways.  
First, the impact of a given policy is measured against the impact of all of the other policies that 
seek to achieve the same goal.  Typically, policy analysis explores the impact of a single policy 
on a phenomenon.  My approach allows for the analysis of a given policy while controlling for 
the influence of all of the other policies in a policy arena.  This prevents the statistical model 
from incorrectly measuring policy impact due to an underspecified model.  This statistical 
approach also allows for a more complete understanding of the policy impacts. 
Second, this project differentiates itself from previous policy analysis research by 
examining the impact of policies in more than one way.  Usually, policy analysis projects will 
study the cumulative change in the issue, while others may examine yearly change, but these two 
approaches are seldom combined.  As discussed, this approach allows for a more nuanced 
examination of the impact of a given policy. 
Existing policy analysis literature suggests that achieving goals through incentives 
typically fails (e.g. Cantwell 1970; Sagoff 1988).  While this project doesn‟t necessarily 
contradict these findings, it does suggest that this isn‟t always the case, and that incentive 
policies can achieve policy goals.  The results of this analysis indicate that some policies have a 
strong positive effect on installed wind energy.  Consequently, unlike previous research, this 
project suggests that legislatures should continue to experiment with incentive policies because 
some of them may actually work. 
Finally, this project demonstrates the necessity of policy scholars to evaluate whether a 
policy achieves its goals, or if it fails to do so.  Research, such as this, could be used by state and 
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federal legislators to determine what type of incentive policies ought to be offered.  This research 
reveals that several state incentive policies may actually be money pits, and this could be very 
useful information to policymakers.  However, it is critical to note that the results presented here 
only apply to installed wind capacity.  It is possible that these policies would have a different 
impact on the installation of solar power or any of the other eligible renewable systems. 
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Renewable energy has become a multi-billion dollar industry in the United States.  Yet, 
the national government and states have dedicated billions of dollars to helping to support this 
relatively fledgling industry.  I attempt to determine what influences states to adopt policies that 
encourage the development of renewable energy systems, and I examined if these policies have 
actually obtain a measurable impact on the construction of wind turbines.  Throughout this 
project, I address several analytical concerns that are commonly found within the policy adoption 
literature, and attempt to identify a more appropriate way to examine these relationships.  In the 
end, several important conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. 
Following the analysis of eighteen state renewable energy policies, it is clear that 
comparative state policy adoption scholars need to revisit the many theories of public policy.  As 
outlined in Chapter 2, there are three clearly universal themes that can be identified in all of the 
public policy theories – internal determinants, feedback loops, and the importance of time.  
Nearly all comparative state policy adoption studies focus on the internal determinants and time, 
but only a few have included the feedback loop (e.g. Balla 2001; Soule and Earl 2001; 
Stoutenborough and Beverlin 2008).  As illustrated in Chapters 4 and 5, these feedback loops can 
play an important role in influencing the adoption of a policy.  Specifically, the analyses clearly 
illustrated that the inclusion of previously adopted policies concerning renewable energy 
influenced the adoption of other policies, and that they provided better specified models of 
adoption.  A comparison of the traditional analyses – those without previously adopted policies – 
and the expanded analyses – those with previously adopted policies – reveal that there are 
several significant estimation differences between these types of analyses, which illustrates the 
importance of controlling for the influence of previously adopted policies.  Moreover, this 
indicates that there may be sequencing in the adoption of policies, such that certain policies are 
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often adopted before others.  However, additional research is needed before any process tracing 
elements to the adoption process can be ascertained. 
Additionally, I began to outline a possible relationship between policy diffusion and these 
feedback loops in Chapter 2.  While this relationship still needs to be further developed, there 
appears to be a connection between the feedback loop and policy diffusion that may suggest that 
policy diffusion provides the mechanism by which to evaluate the policies that a state currently 
has.  If this relationship is true, then this will help us to better explain how this feedback loop 
works, and it will securely place the model of policy diffusion (Schlager 2007) within existing 
policy theories, which should be beneficial for our understanding of policy adoption. 
We know that states are constantly learning whether through experience or the sharing of 
information between states and that states will often compete against one another, which are all 
characteristics typically associated with driving policy diffusion (Berry and Berry 2007).  I begin 
to explore the possibility that the learning or competitive process that allow states to find out 
what other states are doing will likely provide the mechanism to evaluate the policies that the 
state has already adopted to determine if the state needed to adopt a new policy.  In short, if a 
state compares their current policies to those adopted by another state, and determine that their 
current policies are insufficient, then they are more likely to adopt a policy that is similar to what 
others have adopted.  However, if the state evaluates the policy, and determines that their current 
policies are sufficient, then they are less likely to adopt.  This evaluation process may explain 
why a state may have several of the same type of policy.  For instance, New Mexico has four 
personal tax incentive policies.  This connection between policy diffusion and the feedback loop 
would explain that as New Mexico learned what other states were doing, they determined that 
198 
 
their current personal tax incentives were insufficient, which caused them to adopt additional 
policies that replicated what other states had adopted. 
In addition to illustrating the importance of modeling previously adopted policies, I 
challenge the way we traditionally model policy diffusion.  As argued in Chapter 3, policy 
adoption scholars typically use the power of fiat to determine which form of diffusion a policy 
follows.  These studies rarely attempt to justify why a particular form was chosen.  Moreover, I 
confront the assumption that regional, or neighbor, diffusion and leader-laggard diffusion are 
mutually exclusive.  I anticipate that there may be leaders and laggards in regional, or neighbor, 
diffusion, and that states are more likely to turn to their neighbors that are leaders than those that 
are traditionally laggards for policy solutions.  If this presumption is true, then it would be 
extremely difficult to identify which form of diffusion best explains the spread of policies across 
the country. 
To combat this problem, I proposed that we should model all five forms of diffusion – 
regional, neighbor, leader-laggard, and a hybrid of both regional and neighbor with leader-
laggard.  While this is clearly a cumbersome process, Chapters 4 and 5 clearly indicate that this 
approach will best allow us to explain policy adoption.  The results presented in those chapters 
find that all five forms of diffusion provide the best specified model of policy adoption 
depending upon the policy examined.  In addition to illustrating the importance of modeling 
multiple forms of diffusion, these results suggest that policy scholars cannot rely on the results of 
previous diffusion studies to identify what form of diffusion they should model.   It is important 
to correctly measure the influence of policy diffusion because, as Chapters 4 and 5 consistently 
indicated, relying on an incorrect, or worse specified, measure could result in incorrect 
coefficient estimates for the independent variables.  Beyond estimation concerns, we ought to 
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make sure that we estimate the correct form of diffusion on theoretical grounds as well.  If, as 
argued, each of these five forms of diffusion provide a different theoretical explanation of how 
learning occurs, it is essential that we get this right. 
I also felt it was important to analyze all of the policies using the same statistical 
approach to allow for comparisons after all of the policies were analyzed.  Comparisons across 
policies within an issue area are rarely, if ever, attempted, and the results of these analyses 
suggest that this can be an incredibly informative approach to understanding policy adoption.  As 
Tables 4.19 and 5.19 illustrate, internal determinants and previously adopted policies can provide 
a vastly different influence on policy adoption depending upon the specific policy adoption.  
While beyond the scope of this current project, future analyses will attempt to better understand 
why the same variable will have a positive influence on some policies, but a negative influence 
on others.  For instance, as Table 4.19 indicates, why do nuclear power plants provide a positive 
influence in a third of the models, and a negative influence in another third?  This approach to 
analyzing adoption using the same models can set the stage for analyses that will better allow us 
to understand exactly how our independent variables interact with our dependent variables. 
Through these additions to the policy adoption literature, I am able to provide a strong 
understanding of what may have influenced a state to adopt a renewable energy policy. 
Generally, the results indicate that virtually all of the variables can provide either a positive or 
negative impact, depending upon the actual policy.  However, four policies – green power 
purchasing, required green power, public benefits funds, and net metering – only appear to have 
a positive impact on the adoption of other policies.  Interestingly, three of these policies, green 
power purchasing, required green power, and public benefits funds, were expected to only have a 
positive influence on the adoption of another policy.  These three, and renewable portfolio 
200 
 
standards (which only had a significant negative influence once), were the only four previously 
adopted policies where it was reasonable to have a preconceived notion of directionality prior to 
the analyses. 
After the analyses of the adoption of all of these policies, I wanted to determine if they 
were achieving their legislative goals by providing a measurable impact on the construction of 
renewable systems.  Rarely are the policies that are important enough to analyze the adoption 
process taken to the next logical level – analyzing their impact.  Typically, this disconnect is 
related to the difficulty of gathering data that will allow for such an analysis.  Fortunately, there 
has been a strong effort to track the construction of wind turbines in the United States, which 
allowed for the analysis of influence of these policies on the installed wind energy capacity in 
each state. 
Traditionally, these types of analyses only examine the impact of policies in one manner.  
I estimated this relationship in two manners which allow for different interpretations of the 
impact of the same policies.  The first was an analysis of the impact of these policies on the total, 
cumulative installed capacity in each state.  This allows for an analysis of the long-term 
influence of these policies.  The second was an analysis of the yearly installed capacity in each 
state.  In this model, the existence of previously build wind turbines has no influence on the 
construction of new turbines.  This allowed for an analysis of the short-term impact of the 
policies.  The results indicate that this approach is quite useful, as only analyzing this using one 
approach instead of the other would only tell part of the story, and it may allow for a 
misinterpretation of the influence of a policy on the construction of wind turbines. 
 These analyses also differed from previous attempts to measure policy impact by 
modeling all of the policies at the same time.  Policy impact studies have traditionally modeled 
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this process as if they were working in a vacuum where the influence of one policy has 
absolutely no influence on the influence of another.  Instead, it should be clear that all of the 
policies within the issue area ought to be influencing the dependent variable at the same time.  
The results of these analyses clearly indicate that this all inclusive approach provides a strong 
explanation of the influence of any given policy on the construction of wind turbines.   
Additionally, previous research into the use of financial incentives to achieve an 
environmental goal has consistently found that that these policies fail (e.g. Sagoff 1988).  By 
implementing these simple methodological changes, the results indicate that this may not always 
be true.  Indeed, the results find that some policies do provide a negative impact, which is 
consistent with this research, but other policies clearly have a positive impact.  Perhaps these 
previous studies would benefit from the statistical approach operationalized in Chapter 6. 
Finally, this project has uncovered several future avenues of research.  As mentioned, I 
would like to work to better understand the sequencing of policy adoption through a process 
tracing analysis.  I would also like to further explore the relationship between policy diffusion 
and the feedback loop.  I would also like to examine the influence of interest groups on the 
adoption of renewable energy policies.  At this point, it has been difficult to identify all of the 
interest groups active in renewable energy going back to the 1970s, but I‟m hoping that groups 
that have already been identified will be able to fill in this missing information.  In short, there is 
a lot more research that needs to be done to truly understand renewable energy policymaking. 
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Appendix A 
 
EPA Regions: 
 
EPA Region 1 – Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont 
EPA Region 2 – New Jersey, New York 
EPA Region 3 – Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia 
EPA Region 4 – Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Tennessee 
EPA Region 5 – Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Wisconsin 
EPA Region 6 – Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas 
EPA Region 7 – Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska 
EPA Region 8 – Colorado, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Wyoming 
EPA Region 9 – Arizona, California, Hawaii, Nevada 
EPA Region 10 – Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, Washington 
 
 
